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politics of our developing social media systems. 
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I: INTRODUCTION
It was the spread of the message that mattered [in the history of 
communication] — not its origin but its amplification, the way it reached 
the public and ultimately took hold.  That process should be understood as 
a matter of feedback and convergence, rather than one of trickling down 
and linear causality.
- Robert Darnton, “News and the Media in Eighteenth-Century Paris”1
1. Suppressing J30Strike
In June 2011, as heat and hardship beat down on Britain, progressive activists 
proposed a general strike to protest austerity measures. Like many movements over the last 
decade they began organizing the strike online.2 They created a website at J30Strike.org and 
launched a publicity campaign through social media, especially by sharing links to the site 
through Facebook’s News Feed. 
It’s easy to understand why. Facebook is a top source of visitors for the five most 
popular news sites in the United States.3 The analytics company Shareaholic estimates that 
Facebook refers more than 25% of global traffic it tracks.4 Facebook’s News Feed does more 
than just capture and redistribute eyeballs: like the front page of a major newspaper, it also 
articulates an agenda, assembling a summary digest of important events. “As more and more is 
shared,” wrote engineer Peter Deng after Facebook centrally embedded the News Feed, “we 
want you to be able to find out everything that is going on in the world around you.”5 It’s a 
6
1 Robert Darnton,“An Early Information Society: News and the Media in Eighteenth-Century Paris.” The 
American Historical Review 105, no. 1 (February 2000), available online at http://www.jstor.org/stable/2652433 and 
http://www.historians.org/info/aha_history/rdarnton.htm/.
2 See generally Clay Shirky, Here Comes Everybody: The Power of Organizing Without Organizations (New York: 
Penguin Press, 2008). For a critique of the role of networked technologies to in supporting social movements, 
compare Evgeny Morozov, The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom (PublicAffairs, 2012). 
3 Ross Dawson, “Where News Website Traffic Comes from: Google Vs Facebook - Trends in the Living 
Networks.” Trends in the Living Networks, May 9, 2011, http://rossdawsonblog.com/weblog/archives/2011/05/where-
news-website-traffic-comes-from-google-vs-facebook.html/.
4 Colleen Taylor, “Study: Pinterest Drives More Referral Traffic Than Google+, Nearly on Par with Twitter.” 
GigaOM, January 31, 2012, http://gigaom.com/2012/01/31/pinterest-referral-traffic-google-plus-twitter/.
5 Peter Deng, “Welcome to Your New Home Page.” The Facebook Blog, March 11, 2009, http://blog.facebook.com/
blog.php?post=59195087130/.
vision of social media as a kind of map, as an atlas informing users of worthwhile destinations 
and providing routes, in the form of links, through which they may be reached.
But, ten days before the strike, Facebook began notifying the activists that links to 
J30Strike.org could not be shared because they “[contained] blocked content that has 
previously been flagged as abusive or spammy” by other users.6 It erased all links to J30Strike. 
Then, with relentless, recursive efficiency, Facebook blocked links to sites which themselves 
linked to J30Strike, including blog posts informing other activists of the embargo.7 J30Strike 
suddenly vanished from the picture of the world projected by the News Feed. It wasn’t filtered 
by a government or corporation. Its servers weren’t disabled by hackers. J30Strike was still 
perfectly accessible but had become strangely unavailable. Like a rural village erased from a map 
of the English countryside but not from the countryside itself, the site was still there, but 
suddenly became much less likely to be found by casual travelers.  
I knew some of the J30Strike activists. I wrote one of the blog posts which was blocked 
by Facebook.8 Watching J30Strike disappear from my map disturbed me. My News Feed had 
indeed appeared a comprehensive record of everything important going on in the world around 
me, but my sudden inability to link to J30Strike destabilized this perspective, revealing instead 
its highly contingent character. What I and others were allowed to see depended upon a 
complex and invisible confluence of forces largely beyond our control. I began to wonder: what 
else was being hidden from me? How? And by whom?
7
6 A copy of the message can be seen at http://etc.cpeterson.org/MIT/cms/thesis/images/j30strikeblocked.jpg/.
7 See, e.g., my blog post: http://www.cpeterson.org/2011/06/20/facebook-censors-citizen-activism-website/, which 
was blocked with this message: http://etc.cpeterson.org/MIT/cms/thesis/images/blogpostblocked.jpg/.
8 For more on J30Strike, see Nick Baumann, “Why Did Facebook Block UK Strike Site?” Mother Jones, http://
www.motherjones.com/mojo/2011/06/why-did-facebook-block-uk-strike-website/.
2. Questions, Definitions, Cases 
	
 These questions have a negative valence, but the purpose of this thesis is not to argue 
whether the Internet is ‘good’ or ‘bad’ (or, as Evgeny Morozov might tartly observe, whether 
“the Internet” is a coherent category of inquiry itself).9 Instead, its purpose is to explore some 
questions prompted by my experience with J30Strike. These include: how are the pictures of 
the world produced by social media projected? By whom? With what effects? For what 
reasons? More specifically, I aim to investigate an emergent practice which I call user-generated 
censorship: an evolving mode of intervention by which users strategically manipulate social 
media to suppress information. 
	
 Countless scholars have studied what is commonly called ‘Internet censorship,’ 
including the ‘intermediary censorship’ of social media platforms.10 Others, most prominently 
Eli Pariser and Cass Sunstein, have argued that the feedback loops produced by unwitting 
users interacting with algorithms may cause common lifeworlds to diverge.11 User-generated 
censorship, however, differs from these more familiar models. J30Strike did not disappear 
from my News Feed because it was targeted by some devious autocrat within a corporation or 
state, nor because I signaled a personal disinterest in radical politics. Instead, it was made to drop 
by other users, whose decentralized signals were aggregated and enforced through a 
centralized platform, creating a new capacity for many distributed actors to suppress speech 
through the power of the algorithm. 
8
9 Evgeny Morozov, To Save Everything, Click Here: The Folly of Technological Solutionism (Public Affairs, 2013). 
10 See, e.g., Access Denied: The Practice and Policy of Global Internet Filtering (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2008); 
Access Controlled: The Shaping of Power, Rights, and Rule in Cyberspace (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2010), 
particularly chapter 5 by Ethan Zuckerman, available at http://www.access-controlled.net/wp-content/PDFs/
chapter-5.pdf); Rebecca MacKinnon, Consent of the Networked: The World-wide Struggle for Internet Freedom (New 
York: Basic Books, 2013). 
11 Eli Pariser, The Filter Bubble: How the New Personalized Web Is Changing What We Read and How We Think (Penguin 
Books, 2012); Cass Sunstein, Republic.com 2.0 (Princeton, N.J.; Woodstock: Princeton University Press, 2009). 
	
 Jillian York of the Electronic Frontier Foundation has documented dozens of 
grassroots campaigns to remove content from Facebook.12 In one well-documented case, Brian 
Ries of the TheDailyBeast “decided to conduct a little experiment,” campaigning on his blog to 
have followers mark a post by Sarah Palin as “racist/hate speech.”13 According to Facebook the 
post did not violate any of its content standards, yet within 24 hours the post had nonetheless 
been removed by what spokesperson Andrew Noyes called “an automated system” driven by 
Ries’ actions.14 As Ries later observed, “it took the coordinated actions of a community a 
fraction of [Facebook’s] size” to change the content available through it.15 
	
 Another example occurred on reddit, a popular ‘social news’ site where users vote on 
links which an algorithm then organizes into ranked lists. In early 2012 some critics of 
Republican Presidential candidate Ron Paul discovered that anything they posted, anywhere 
on reddit, was being downvoted dozens of times within minutes. It was later revealed that a 
libertarian redditor had written a program which allowed any Paul supporter to enroll her 
account in a botnet which stalked these critics and rapidly downvoted anything they posted.16 
LibertyBot, as it came to be called, effectively enforced diminished visibility on its enemies, 
sinking their content and comments so far down that other users would be significantly less 
likely to see them. 
9
12 Jillian York, “Policing Content in the Quasi-Public Sphere.” OpenNet Initiative, September 2010. https://
opennet.net/sites/opennet.net/files/PolicingContent.pdf; Jillian York, “AllFacebook.com Editor Uses Bully Pulpit 
in Attempt to Remove Facebook Page,” March 21, 2011, http://jilliancyork.com/2011/03/21/allfacebook-com-
editor-uses-bully-pulpit-to-remove-facebook-page/.
13 Brian Ries, “Help Report Sarah Palin’s Ground Zero...”  http://moneyries.tumblr.com/post/841249526/tumblr-
help-report-sarah-palins-ground-zero/.
14 “Facebook Apologizes for Deletion of Palin Post.” CNN, July 22, 2010, http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/
2010/07/22/facebook-apologizes-for-deletion-of-palin-post/.
15 Brian Ries, “My Facebook War With Palin.” The Daily Beast, July 23, 2010, http://www.thedailybeast.com/
articles/2010/07/23/palins-facebook-ground-zero-mosque-post-how-it-disappeared.html/.
16 Chris Peterson, “The Fault, Dear Reddit, Is Not In Our Bots, But In Ourselves: The Case of LibertyBot.” MIT 
Center for Civic Media, March 22, 2013, http://civic.mit.edu/blog/petey/the-fault-is-not-in-our-bots-dear-reddit-but-
in-ourselves-the-case-of-libertybot/.
	
 Google’s PageRank algorithm famously interprets incoming links as a kind of vote for a 
website such that, all else held equal, more links translates to a higher ranking.17 For many 
years marketers have worked to manipulate search results by writing programs which post 
millions of links pointing to clients’ sites in order to increase their PageRank: one 2006 study 
by Kolari et al. found that nearly 90% of all English-language blogs are in fact spam blogs (or 
“splogs”) created to game search engines.18 Google has long forbidden the practice, and, in 
April 2012, began penalizing sites with large numbers of “unnatural links” leading to them in 
order to disincentive splogs.19 In response some smart spammers simply flipped their business 
models, launching “NegativeSEO” companies which offered clients the ability to point billions 
of “unnatural links” at their competitors to sink them in search.20
	
 All of these platforms are influential intermediaries which incorporate user feedback to 
help decide how prominent the pathways to a particular website should be through them, and 
the ‘democratizing’, ‘participatory’ rhetoric has given rise to associated assumptions that the 
arrangement of these pathways can be trusted by default. As Tarleton Gillespie has observed, 
we seem to want the algorithms of social media “to be neutral, we want them to be reliable, we 
want them to be the effective ways in which we come to know what is most important.”21 
10
17 Page et al. “The PageRank Citation Ranking: Bringing Order to the Web.” (1999). http://ilpubs.stanford.edu:
8090/422; Brin & Page. “The Anatomy of a Large-scale Hypertextual Web Search Engine.” Computer Networks and 
ISDN Systems 30, no. 1 (1998): 107–117, http://infolab.stanford.edu/~backrub/google.html/.
18 Kolari et al. “Characterizing the splogosphere.” In Proceedings of the 3rd annual workshop on weblogging ecosystem: 
Aggregation, analysis and dynamics, 15th World Wide Web conference. University of Maryland, Baltimore County, 2006. 
http://ebiquity.umbc.edu/_file_directory_/papers/261.pdf/. As Finn Brunton writes in, Spam: a Shadow History of the 
Internet (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 2013), at 160, such ‘splogs’ are “a kind of PageRank greenhouse 
which is not in itself meant to be read by people.”
19 Matt Cutts, “Another step to reward high quality sites.” Official Google Webmaster Central Blog, April 24, 2012. 
http://googlewebmastercentral.blogspot.ca/2012/04/another-step-to-reward-high-quality.html/.
20 Chris Peterson, “Google NegativeSEO: Case Study in User-Generated Censorship.” MIT Center for Civic Media, 
March 20, 2013. http://civic.mit.edu/blog/petey/google-negativeseo-case-study-in-user-generated-censorship/.
21 Tarleton Gillespie, “Can an Algorithm Be Wrong? Twitter Trends, the Specter of Censorship, and Our Faith in 
the Algorithms Around Us.” Culture Digitally. October 19, 2011. http://culturedigitally.org/2011/10/can-an-
algorithm-be-wrong/.
	
 Yet in the cases I have described, users strategically deploy their ability to arrange 
information towards making specific pathways less available. The actors are amateurs, not 
professionals; distributed, not centralized; they are granted power not through money or station 
but through the ‘democratizing’ promise of new media. Yet rather than using this newfound 
power to make information more broadly available, as the familiar story goes, they instead 
deploy it to make some information harder to find, reversing their premise and their promise.
	
 I call these cases user-generated because they are animated by signals generated by users 
to overdetermine the arrangement and availability of content through their interactions with 
organizational algorithms. One critical, counterintuitive insight is that the ‘social’ in ‘social 
media’ is not an exclusively human sociality, but instead the ongoing and active association of 
humans and nonhumans alike into a shambling mass made of people, bots, algorithms, and 
other ontologically uncertain actors. I call these cases censorship following Frederick Schauer’s 
ascriptive definition. Censorship, Schauer argues, is best understood as a label which “does not 
describe a category of conduct, but rather attaches an operative conclusion (ascribes) to a 
category created on other grounds.”22 Invocations of censorship, according to Schauer, most 
fundamentally signal anxiety over the allocation of authority to determine access to or 
availability of information. In adopting this definition I characterize these cases as censorship 
primarily because the actors involved insistently do. 
	
 More formally, I define user-generated censorship as follows: 
• Strategic interventions which suppress information by erasing or making to appear 
uninteresting certain sociotechnical pathways through which it can be found
11
22 Frederick Schauer, “The Ontology of Censorship” in Censorship and Silencing: Practices of Cultural Regulation, ed. 
Robert Post (Los Angeles: Getty Research Institute for the History of Art and the Humanities, 1998), 160. 
• Initiated neither at the behest nor the behalf of a formal public or private authority, 
but instead by ‘amateurs’ empowered by the distributed mechanisms of social media
• Which, if revealed, strikes other users as an ‘unauthorized’ or ‘inappropriate’ use of 
these systems, which may be ascribed as a form of censorship 
	

	
 If a case meets these three conditions then I believe it constitutes an emergent mode of 
intervention, broadly distributed to amateurs yet empowered by centralized algorithms, 
inspiring many of the same concerns and complaints of ‘traditional’ censorship but departing 
from its most familiar frameworks and remedies.
3. Outline
	
 My study of user-generated censorship proceeds in three parts. 
	
 First, I ground user-generated censorship in a case study. In Chapter II I conduct a 
qualitative analysis of the Digg Patriots, a group of users active between 2009-2010 who 
strategically manipulated the social news site Digg in order to make it more politically 
conservative. My primary source material is an archive of nearly 13,000 posts from the listserv 
through which they coordinated.23 I’ll examine and share excerpts from this corpus to develop 
a better understanding of the Digg Patriots through their own words and actions as a canonical 
case of user-generated censorship. 
	
 Second, I review a few models through which we might understand and evaluate the 
effects of user-generated censorship. In Chapter III, I argue that user-generated censorship 
could be understood a) as corrupting collective intelligence, b) as disrupting the networked 
12
23 For information about the origins, controversies, and considerations of the corpus please see Appendix A.1. 
public sphere, and/or c) as actor-networks assembling artifacts. The first two models, drawn 
primarily from the work of James Surowiecki and Yochai Benkler respectively, are very 
familiar to analyses of social media. The third, based on the work of Bruno Latour, is 
somewhat less so, but I’ll discuss why I find his actor-network approach advantageous. 
	
 Third, I explore the artifacts of user-generated censorship. In Chapter IV I build on the 
information science scholarship of Markus Krajewski to understand social media as 
sociotechnical machines which make information available. The very centrality of these 
systems, however, also makes them vulnerable points of subversion for those who would wish 
to change the information made available through them. I’ll draw on some concepts from 
Latour to model social media machines as producing incomplete pictures of the world which do 
not reveal their own incompleteness, and to understand user-generated censorship as operating 
by subtly recomposing these panoramas with persuasive effects.  
	
 Studying user-generated censorship provides a point of entry to a broader set of 
questions concerning the cauldrons of conflicting expectations and uncertain effects bubbling 
up from the human and nonhuman actors who together animate social media. I conclude by 
discussing some of these questions and offering two paths forward for investigating the maps 
made by social media. 
II: A CASE STUDY IN USER-GENERATED CENSORSHIP
I don't know if someone has already said this, but Digg Patriots is like 
Fight Club.  The first rule of Digg Patriots is you don't talk about Digg 
Patriots outside of the group.  The libs on digg already suspect that we are 
organized, but they don't know about Digg Patriots.
13
- M.D.H., “Re: BURY LIST”24
1. “Bury Until They Change Their Ways”: Introducing the Digg Patriots
	
 Digg was founded in November 2004.25 A ‘social news’ site, Digg allowed users to 
submit links to other websites and vote them up (‘digg’) or down (‘bury’). An algorithm 
partially informed by these evaluations  ranked the submissions in a list from most popular to 
least popular. The most popular links rose to Digg’s ‘front page.’ In this way Digg’s rankings 
created a feedback loop: the more popular a post became, the higher it rose, and the more 
attention it attracted; the higher it rose, the more attention it attracted, and the more popular it 
became. It was also a tremendous referrer of traffic to the links it ranked. By 2006, Digg was 
receiving and redistributing over 30 million visitors a month, an online audience roughly 
equivalent to that of the New York Times. In 2008 Digg was nearly purchased by Google for 
$200 million.26 In 2010 Digg would crash, be gutted, and later reborn as a different service 
under the same name, but from 2006 through 2010 it was one of the most popular and 
powerful social media sites in the world. It was during this period, at the apex of Digg’s 
influence, that the Digg Patriots arose. 
14
24 This quote was excerpted from a text file in the Digg Patriots’ archive named 20100117-DiggPatriots-Re-
BURY-LIST-10390.html. In subsequent citations I will only include the filename. 
25 Lacy and Hempel. “Valley Boys.” BusinessWeek: Magazine, August 13, 2006. 
http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2006-08-13/valley-boys/.
26 Michael Arrington, “Google In Final Negotiations To Acquire Digg For "Around $200 Million,” TechCrunch, 
July 22, 2008, http://techcrunch.com/2008/07/22/google-in-final-negotiations-to-acquire-digg-for-around-200-
million/.
	
	
 The  Digg Patriots were founded in May 2009 by Lizbett and VRayZ, two highly-
active, politically-conservative Diggers. They created a Yahoo!Group, invited a small number 
of trusted fellow conservatives, and began coordinating through its mailing list to advance 
political conservatism on Digg, a campaign which they came to call “the cause.” R.J. Carter, an 
active member and ardent supporter, described their mission as countering a perceived left-
leaning bias of Digg by coordinating their votes to swiftly and decisively bury liberal links so 
that conservative stories could rise higher, making Digg more conservative in the process. 
SUBJ:	  Re:	  Digg	  Patriots
[The	  Digg	  Patriots	  were]	  comprised,	  or	  intended	  to	  be	  
comprised,	  of	  Digg	  members	  with	  conservative	  political	  
ideals	  as	  a	  means	  of	  countering	  the	  left-­‐leaning	  material	  
submitted	  to	  Digg	  that	  was	  making	  the	  front	  page	  of	  the	  
site	  on	  a	  regular	  basis....these	  were	  submissions	  that	  any	  
member	  of	  the	  Digg	  Patriots	  would	  have	  marked	  for	  burial	  
upon	  encounter.	  But	  by	  organizing	  under	  a	  Yahoo	  group,	  the	  
first	  member	  to	  encounter	  it	  could	  immediately	  let	  the	  
others	  know	  it	  was	  there.	  This	  had	  the	  desired	  impact	  -­‐-­‐	  
that	  a	  mass	  of	  early	  burials	  would	  keep	  it	  off	  the	  front	  
page	  when	  the	  same	  number	  of	  burials	  spread	  over	  time	  
Figure 1: The homepage of the Digg Patriots Yahoo!Group in August 2010.
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would	  not....The	  Digg	  Patriots	  could	  have	  been	  more	  
successful	  [but]	  it	  did	  have	  the	  capability	  of	  keeping	  the	  
field	  clear	  of	  "debris	  and	  detritus"	  so	  that	  other	  news	  
stories	  could	  get	  to	  the	  front	  page.	  
	  -­‐	  R.J	  Carter,	  February	  12	  201327 
SUBJ:	  Re:	  DiggPatriots-­‐	  Whining	  again
I'll	  continue	  to	  bury	  their	  submissions	  until	  they	  change	  
their	  ways	  and	  become	  conservatives.	  =^)
-­‐	  VRayZ,	  June	  6	  201028
 
	
 At least 54 members of the Digg Patriots exchanged almost 13,000 messages over the 
course of 11 months. The corpus includes almost 7,000 unique Digg links they targeted, 
although this represents a tiny fraction of their total activity. From April 2009 to August 2010 
Lizbett alone dugg an astounding 76,000 links and submitted over 1,600 articles, 20% of which 
made the front page, a respectable ratio for a site with millions of members and billions of 
submissions.29 Many of their campaigns, like this exchange from early in the corpus, began 
with a link to be targeted, with subsequent responses confirming action had been taken.
SUBJ:	  Bury
Kill	  stab	  hit	  spit	  bury	  thank	  you
http://digg.com/political_opinion/Dickipedia_Teabaggers_2
-­‐	  Lizbett,	  September	  22	  200930
SUBJ:	  Re:	  Bury
stomped	  on	  it	  with	  golf	  cleats...
-­‐	  Individually	  Warped,	  September	  22	  200931
16
27 R.J. Carter, email to author, February 12, 2013. As I describe in Appendix A.1, R.J. was one of only two 
Patriots to respond to my requests for comment. This quote was in response to an email from me saying “I'd be 
curious to know how you and others defined the movement, its validity, and its success (or failure).”
28 20100606-DiggPatriots-Whining-again-1877.html.
29 For Lizbett’s statistics, see http://socialblade.com/digg/top1000users.html under name ‘bettverboten’. Statistics 
for her original account, ‘lizbett,‘ can be seen at http://socialblade.com/digg/topgraveyard.html. Both links 
accessed on May 24, 2013. 
30 20090922-DiggPatriots-Bury-8405.html
31 20090922-DiggPatriots-Bury-8404.html
SUBJ:	  Re:	  Bury
stomped	  flat
-­‐	  Gloria	  L,	  September	  22	  200932
SUBJ:	  Re:	  Bury
Not	  only	  that,	  I	  reported	  it	  as	  spam,	  pornographic,	  and	  
"calculated	  hate	  that	  goes	  beyond	  the	  limits	  of	  taste	  even	  
in	  political	  invective."
I	  also	  pointed	  out,	  as	  if	  they	  didn't	  know,	  that	  
"jblogging"	  and	  "thejoshuablog"	  are	  one	  and	  the	  same	  
accountholder,	  and	  cited	  his	  avatar	  as	  evidence.
-­‐	  Temlakos,	  September	  22	  200933
	

	
 By far the most common action was downvoting, but, as can be seen in Temlakos’ post, 
the Patriots would also report liberal posts as spam, duplicates, or for other Terms of Service 
violations. In addition to sending messages to each other, they also employed a variety of tools 
and techniques which allowed them to closely track submissions by liberal users so that they 
could instantly target them for downvoting. 
Figure 2: An message from Lizbett targeting an link (ironically about increasing 
conservative influence on Digg) for burying.
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32 20090922-DiggPatriots-Bury-8403.html
33 20090922-DiggPatriots-Bury-8402.html
2. “Any Chair In A Bar Fight”: Mission, Metrics, & Methods
SUBJ:	  Going	  to	  be	  very	  busy	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  month
...Keep	  beating	  back	  the	  flood	  of	  stupidity,	  also	  known	  as	  
liberalism.	  Fight	  the	  good	  fight.	  
-­‐	  tccbossm4n,	  July	  16	  201034
SUBJ:	  Re:	  Renewed	  Interest	  in	  Burying
I'm	  amazed	  at	  their	  lack	  of	  organization.	  	  If	  they	  had	  
half	  a	  wit	  among	  them	  they	  could	  bury	  any	  and	  every	  
submission	  we	  have	  but	  as	  in	  real	  life	  I	  guess,	  liberals	  
just	  roll	  with	  the	  tide	  through	  Digg	  like	  they	  do	  in	  real	  
life.	  	  They	  have	  no	  work	  ethic,	  no	  core	  values	  and	  no	  
common	  sense	  beneath	  the	  paper	  thin	  liberal	  skin	  they	  
cover	  themselves	  with.	  	  	  
-­‐	  VRayZ,	  June	  17	  201035
	  
	
 “I’d love for you to feel better about Digg and a be stronger player” Lizbett encouraged 
one new member.36 Indeed, many Patriots focused on becoming ‘stronger,’ ‘more effective’ 
Diggers, which signifies how profoundly they thought of Digg as a system through which they 
could do something. They needed to develop strength, to become stronger, to win the battles in 
Figure 3: A screenshot circulated among the Patriots celebrating they had successfully 
buried four of the five most recent articles submitted by a liberal user they tracked.
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34 20100716-DiggPatriots-Going-to-be-very-busy-for-the-rest-of-the-month-not-around-much-5884.html
35 20100617-DiggPatriots-Renewed-Interest-in-Burying-1786.html
36 20100621-DiggPatriots-What-should-I-do-2421.html
which they believed they were embroiled. “We need to continue the fight,” read the first line of 
the Yahoo!Group’s description, and such combative language pervades the Patriots’ posts. 
“Another one bites the dust,” gloated tccbossm4n of a post they successfully buried.37 The 
Patriots believed that they were outnumbered by liberal users but could outwork and outfight 
them to make Digg more conservative. 
SUBJ:	  Re:	  Bury	  Now	  Novahater's	  sub
Again	  the	  question	  arises	  about	  the	  validity	  of	  us	  
organizing	  through	  email...
I	  feel	  we	  are	  far	  outnumbered.	  So	  does	  that	  make	  what	  we	  
do	  right?
To	  fight	  for	  what	  is	  right	  and	  just,	  I	  would	  say	  yes.	  
Hopefully	  more	  people	  will	  see	  our	  beliefs	  as	  the	  right	  
way.	  We're	  called	  the	  right	  for	  a	  reason.
-­‐	  R.J.C.,	  October	  29	  200938
SUBJ:	  Re:	  Bury	  Now	  Novahater's	  sub
I	  think	  Digg's	  rules	  against	  networking	  to	  organize	  
digging	  and	  burying	  are	  bulls**t,	  so	  I	  don't	  have	  any	  
remorse	  about	  our	  own	  networking.	  	  As	  for	  trying	  to	  get	  
the	  other	  side	  in	  trouble	  for	  doing	  it-­‐-­‐I'm	  a	  big	  believer	  
in	  the	  "any	  chair	  in	  a	  bar	  fight"	  philosophy.
Kurt	  H.,	  October	  29	  200939
	
  Digg’s Terms of Service forbade “inflating or altering the ‘digg count’ [or] participating 
in any other organized effort” to affect rankings, and the Patriots themselves believed they 
were breaking these rules through their coordination. They were very worried they would be 
caught: “Be very careful who you invite here, as the ‘bury’ list can get ALL of us permanently 
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38 20091029-DiggPatriots-Bury-Now-Novahaters-sub-14422.html
39 20091029-DiggPatriots-Bury-Now-Novahaters-sub-14423.html
banned,” warned Janet M. However, they justified their rulebreaking by appealing to the 
conservative cause - and their love of fighting liberals. 
SUBJ:	  Re:	  let’s	  see	  if	  he	  takes	  the	  bait
...I'm	  a	  big	  mouth.	  	  I	  did	  not	  join	  Digg	  (and	  I	  did	  long	  
before	  I	  came	  here)	  to	  be	  a	  shrinking	  violet.	  	  I	  didn't	  
join	  in	  order	  to	  put	  submissions	  on	  the	  front	  page.
I	  joined	  in	  order	  to	  be	  myself	  and	  to	  give	  some	  a-­‐hole	  
liberals	  who	  had	  been	  unchallenged	  ...	  I	  joined	  to	  give	  
them	  a	  challenge.
-­‐	  Jill	  K.,	  June	  21	  201040
SUBJ:	  Re:	  DiggPatriots-­‐	  Maybe...
if	  digg	  loses	  it's	  competitive	  nature,	  and	  let's	  face	  it	  
the	  real	  satisfaction	  [is]	  in	  burying	  the	  fools	  and	  
hearing	  them	  cry	  endlessly	  about	  it,	  where	  is	  the	  fun	  ?	  
the	  whole	  "everyone	  wins	  because	  the	  only	  people	  i	  will	  
relate	  with	  agree	  with	  me"	  thing	  is,	  how	  can	  i	  say	  it,	  too	  
freakin'	  libtard	  for	  me.	  i	  don't	  use	  my	  twitter,	  facebook,	  
or	  myspace	  accounts	  and	  landed	  on	  digg	  because	  i	  like	  
fighting	  with	  my	  enemies	  and	  i	  really	  like	  winning.	  The	  
dp's	  have	  had	  an	  impact.	  where	  will	  the	  impact	  be	  if	  
you're	  swimming	  with	  the	  current	  ?
Brendan	  M.,	  July	  5	  201041
	
 “Half the reason I come to digg is to bury the libs,” observed VRayZ.42 Indeed, a love of 
fighting for its own sake made it worthwhile for many Patriots to battle even the most 
incorrigibly liberal opponents. “[They] are what they are and they aren't going to change. bury 
them without remorse,” wrote Brendan M. However, even he still evaluated his actions by 
whether they advanced the cause - whether they had an ‘impact.’43 Brendan M., like many 
other members of the Patriots, stayed at Digg in part because he thought it was too liberal and 
because he thought he could make it more conservative. He lamented the rumored removal of 
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41 20100705-DiggPatriots-Maybe-4350.html
42 20100628-DiggPatriots-anamolys-mad-at-me-3447.html
43 20100617-DiggPatriots-Whining-again-1911.html
the bury button, which would remove his ability to have an impact, to make a difference. When 
the love of fighting ran up against the need to win, it was usually the latter which carried the 
day. 
SUBJ:	  Re	  -­‐	  BurY	  Mutual?
Please,	  Please,stop	  the	  discussions.	  	  You	  are	  playing	  
right	  into	  their	  hands.If	  you	  just	  can't	  help	  yourself,	  
then	  Maybe	  you	  should	  find	  another	  outlet	  for	  your	  
frustration.	  I	  spend	  far	  too	  much	  time	  on	  Digg	  to	  see	  it	  
wasted	  by	  immature	  sniping.I	  hope	  no	  one	  is	  offended,	  but	  
remember	  why	  we	  are	  here.	  We	  want	  to	  Depress	  the	  
progressive	  stories,	  while	  encouraging	  conservative	  ones.
-­‐	  rgcmsg	  G,	  March	  29	  201044
	
 The dynamic tension between these contradictory motivations gave rise to a fascinating 
rule against commenting on liberal posts. “Don't comment while it's live (wait 24hr or close 
with not many diggs) is the general rule of thumb,” advised asamidigg.45 This convention 
developed after the Patriots came to believe the Digg algorithm interpreted comments as an 
index of interest: posts with more comments would rise more quickly, and posts with less 
would fall further faster. They treated comments not as a process of deliberative discourse but 
as a tool which could be leveraged to increase or decrease visibility. Instead of raging at their 
enemies, they did their best to keep quiet: “Venting here, so I don't violate DP discipline and 
comment on a submission we're trying to bury,” as Kurt H. wrote.46 Meanwhile, they tried to 
trick liberal users into pushing their own submissions higher. “We probably should concentrate 
on commenting on each others stories and creating conversational comments to pull in more 
people to comment when they come by to digg on our stories,” mused Lizbett.47 “I try to do it 
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44 20100329-DiggPatriots-BurY-Mutual-12404.html
45 20100325-DiggPatriots-Re-Bury-12212.html
46 20100326-DiggPatriots-Bury-12308.html
47 20100212-DiggPatriots-Re-Novahators-Sub-More-BURY-13994.html
for all the DPs  subs, especially if there are no comments, I  comment just to try and start some 
conversation.”48 
SUBJ:	  Maybe	  we	  can	  still	  bury	  this
what's	  with	  [liberal	  Digger]	  PhilPerspective	  hitting	  the	  
front	  page	  so	  much	  lately?	  Looks	  like	  we're	  falling	  down	  
on	  the	  job,	  or	  at	  least	  need	  to	  shift	  our	  focus.	  
-­‐	  tccbossm4n,	  December	  4	  200949
SUBJ:	  Anomaly100	  thinks	  Novenator	  is	  all	  that...
What	  she	  doesn't	  know,	  is	  that	  our	  group	  is	  growing	  larger	  
by	  the	  day	  and	  [liberal	  Digger]	  novy	  is	  going	  to	  have	  a	  
harder	  time	  having	  his	  stories	  pop...
Individually	  Warped,	  February	  14	  201050
	  
	
 The Patriots evaluated their impact by straightforward metrics: they wanted 
conservative posts to “pop” (rise to the front page) and liberal posts to be “buried” (sunk deep 
in the rankings). Popped stories were alive with attention; buried stories were effectively dead. 
“We are the Kevorkian of liberal stories on Digg. I hate Kevorkian, but I think in this case it is 
a great comparison. It is like putting down a suffering animal,” joked Individually Warped.51 
They bent their collect effort to make it harder for liberal links ever to rise from the dead. 
SUBJ:	  RE:	  Bury
You	  know	  people....	  	  I	  got	  a	  feeling	  if	  we	  can	  pull	  
another	  10	  or	  15	  active	  DP	  members	  in	  we	  could	  turn	  Digg	  
conservative.....
VRayZ,	  March	  5	  201052
SUBJ:	  Re:	  I	  think	  we	  need	  to	  bury	  this
It	  is	  kind	  of	  a	  learn	  as	  you	  go	  deal.	  I	  	  see	  what	  works	  
for	  other	  people	  so	  I	  try	  to	  reshape	  my	  actions	  to	  make	  me	  
a	  better	  social	  digger.	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48 20100413-DiggPatriots-I-think-we-need-to-bury-this-12731.html
49 20091204-DiggPatriots-Maybe-we-can-still-bury-this-9649.html
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51 20100628-DiggPatriots-anamolys-mad-at-me-3441.html
52 20100305-DiggPatriots-Bury-11765.html
Lizbett,	  April	  13	  201053
	
 But the Patriots knew they weren’t strong enough to win this fight on their own. “DPs 
is a place to share and get support for your subs, but we are not big enough or strong enough 
to get the job done,” observed Lizbett.54 However, they were extremely hesitant to bring new 
members on board who might betray their coordination and get them banned. “[He] could be 
like a digg double agent, wanting us to think he's on our side when all along he's playing for 
the other team,” worried allisonrose870 of one proposed recruit.55 Over the course of the 
corpus only two new members were added to the group, and only after having been thoroughly 
and carefully vetted by senior members. To become stronger players, as Lizbett urged all 
Patriots to do, they instead invented a way to enlist reliable, riskless recruits to join their team. 
SUBJ:	  RE:	  FP	  for	  J!
Okay	  folks,	  want	  to	  hit	  FP	  often?	  Follow	  J's	  lead.	  He's	  
got	  90+	  friends	  all	  who	  digg	  early	  (this	  is	  key).	  If	  you	  
can	  cultivate	  90-­‐100	  friends	  like	  this	  your	  subs	  will	  hit	  
on	  a	  regular	  basis,	  but	  cultivating	  this	  many	  GOOD	  friends	  
requires	  you	  to	  do	  the	  same	  for	  them.	  Gotta	  digg	  'em	  early	  
and	  never	  miss.
phil	  d.,	  June	  17	  201056	  
SUBJ:	  Re:	  DiggPatriots-­‐	  What	  should	  I	  do?
For	  the	  next	  2/3	  weeks,	  don't	  sub	  at	  all,	  but	  concentrate	  
on	  a)	  digging	  good	  mutuals(ie	  those	  who	  digg	  more	  than	  50%	  
of	  your	  stuff)	  AND	  also	  b)	  concentrate	  on	  digging	  active	  
diggers...
	  
It's	  important	  to	  remember	  that	  digg	  is	  all	  about	  give	  and	  
take.	  	  If	  you	  never	  digg	  someones	  subs,	  they	  will	  notice	  
and	  not	  bother	  digging	  yours.	  Conversely,	  if	  they	  notice	  
you	  digging	  theirs,	  they	  will	  digg	  yours...
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Change	  your	  profile	  to	  mention	  that	  are	  an	  active	  digger	  
and	  you	  faithfully	  digg	  your	  mutual's	  subs.	  Keep	  your	  
mutuals	  list	  to	  somewhere	  between	  90	  and	  130	  mutuals.	  This	  
will	  enable	  you	  to	  get	  all	  your	  mutual's	  subs	  early	  and	  
reliably.	  
Remember	  that	  digg	  is	  all	  about:	  'you	  scratch	  my	  back	  and	  
i'll	  scratch	  yours'.
It	  may	  take	  2	  or	  3	  months	  for	  you	  to	  get	  yourself	  into	  the	  
consciousness	  of	  active	  diggers	  around	  digg.	  For	  each	  FP	  
that	  you	  get,	  that	  increases	  your	  visibility	  and	  the	  
'marketing'(when	  you	  comment	  early	  on	  people's	  subs	  and	  
you	  digg	  other	  people's	  subs	  early,	  you	  are	  effectively	  
marketing	  yourself)	  of	  yourself	  many-­‐fold.
Get	  rid	  of	  those	  in	  your	  mutuals	  list	  who	  are	  below	  your	  
threshold	  (eg	  less	  than	  4	  or	  5	  of	  your	  recent	  subs)	  and	  
mutuals	  those	  in	  your	  fans	  list	  who	  are	  digging	  your	  stuff	  
often	  and	  early.
-­‐	  J.,	  June	  21	  201057
	  
	
 The solution was hit upon by J., a sort of senior strategist and tactician for the Patriots 
whom Lizbett fondly described as her mentor. In 2009-2010 Digg provided a symmetrical 
relationship between users called “mutuals”: if two users agreed to be mutuals then each could 
easily see what the other had submitted. Digg’s developers designed mutuals to assist users in 
seeing what their friends were sharing as a means of facilitating serendipitous discovery. J., 
however, realized the Patriots could extend their influence through mutuals - if they picked the 
right ones. He began grooming mutuals, selecting them not by whether they agreed with his 
politics, but whether they would rapidly, regularly, and reliably upvote his submissions.58 By 
doing so he was able to muster an army of supporters to push his stories higher. It proved an 
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58 Compare the Patriots’ use of mutuals to Brunton’s observations on the phenomenon of ‘personality spamming,’ 
in Spam, 165: “the work of arrogating attention for oneself, using social media to build an audience -- often a very 
carefully quantified audience of ‘followers’ and ‘rebloggers’ -- rather than a network of friends, as was the initial, 
notional promise. It is a witty condemnation of the socially acceptable but aggressively eyeball-hungry work of 
those who would be, or act like, celebrities, ‘influencers’ or ‘thought leaders.’”
extraordinarily successful strategy and other Patriots quickly followed suit. “It took me over a 
month of cultivating mutuals and friends who digg daily to build up to 125+ diggs a sub,” 
observed phil d., who cheerfully noted that he was now recruiting hundreds more.59
SUBJ:	  BURY
...I'm	  sure	  it's	  the	  same	  with	  most	  people	  as	  it	  is	  with	  
me	  -­‐	  things	  are	  rarely	  personal	  on	  digg.	  The	  only	  thing	  
that	  matters	  is	  if	  you	  are	  digging	  their	  stuff	  or	  
not....There	  is	  a	  feminist	  envirnmentalist	  in	  my	  
list(tomboys),	  but	  she	  seems	  to	  be	  quite	  good	  at	  digging	  
my	  stuff	  so	  i	  don't	  care	  one	  iota	  what	  her	  beliefs	  are.
-­‐	  J.,	  October	  30	  200960
SUBJ:	  Re:	  Bury...
I'm	  the	  same,	  Alan.	  The	  only	  thing	  i	  care	  about	  is	  if	  they	  
are	  going	  to	  digg	  my	  stuff	  consistently	  early	  or	  not.	  I	  
don't	  care	  if	  they	  are	  a	  rabid	  environmentalist	  or	  a	  6	  
humped	  creature	  from	  planet	  Zog.	  If	  they	  digg	  my	  stuff	  and	  
are	  ultra	  active,	  then	  they're	  in	  my	  list.
-­‐	  J.,	  December	  19	  200961
SUBJ:	  Re:	  Please	  help	  with	  comment	  diggs	  Thank	  you
To	  have	  any	  chance	  to	  get	  some	  of	  these	  articles	  to	  FP,	  we	  
are	  going	  to	  have	  to	  push	  extra	  hard...I've	  kept	  a	  low	  
profile	  (politically)	  to	  build	  up	  a	  strong	  mutual	  base,	  
which,	  as	  you	  know,	  we	  need.	  NOW	  is	  the	  time	  to	  see	  who	  
will	  digg	  us,	  after	  months	  of	  digging	  all	  their	  TRASH	  (I'm	  
sure	  you	  know	  what	  I	  mean)	  
Janet	  M.,	  March	  22	  201062
	
 There was broad agreement among the Patriots that mutuals should be measured by 
how effectively they extended conservative influence. Even Janet M., an ultraconservative 
FreeRepublic poster who bitterly hated liberals, assumed a ruthlessly pragmatic perspective. “I 
don't befriend based on someone's politics. I look at their stats,” wrote alanocu_digg.63 J. 
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advised the Patriots not to mutual anyone “east of the Middle East,” not out of latent 
Occidentalism but because the time difference would negatively impact their ability to rapidly 
upvote his submissions.64 For the Patriots, the most valuable mutuals resembled a kind of 
mathematical function or mechanical device, a black box into which new submissions were fed 
and out of which more attention emerged. In a striking ontological inversion, they evaluated 
human mutuals by their least human characteristics; as tools which were useful as long as they 
‘worked’ and discarded as broken once they did not. And at the same time as the Digg Patriots 
began to evaluate humans as technology, they began to evaluate technologies as human.
SUBJ:	  Who	  Runs	  Digg?
...There's	  no	  'algorithm'	  at	  digg.	  The	  'algorithm'	  most	  
likely	  consists	  of	  a	  bunch	  of	  liberal,	  bi-­‐sexual,	  emo-­‐
types,	  who	  drink	  mimosas	  all	  day,	  and	  engage	  in	  a	  circle-­‐
jerk	  by	  night.	  When	  they're	  not	  doing	  that,	  they	  pull	  a	  
few	  levers	  to	  get	  a	  banana	  payoff	  from	  a	  machine,	  which	  
they	  call	  the	  digg	  'algorithm'.	  Just	  my	  opinion,	  but	  
prolly	  spot-­‐on...
-­‐	  rjwusa,	  July	  20	  201065
SUBJ:	  Re:	  Digg’s	  Reply	  -­‐	  They	  buried	  my	  Sub	  in	  2hrs...
It	  IS	  a	  bunch	  of	  shit.	  My	  sub	  today	  did	  not	  pop	  with	  300+	  
diggs	  and	  45	  comments	  So	  I	  wrote	  them	  and	  asked	  them	  why	  
are	  you	  	  ignoring	  my	  stories	  (I	  have	  done	  this	  at	  least	  10	  
times	  now	  so	  it	  is	  not	  like	  it	  	  is	  the	  first	  time)	  
Well	  low	  and	  behold	  my	  story	  popped	  about	  	  10	  minutes	  
later	  about	  an	  hour++after	  the	  24	  hour	  period
If	  I	  do	  nothing	  they	  do	  nothing.	  If	  I	  	  complain	  my	  story	  
pops.	  If	  they	  like	  you...	  your	  stories	  pop	  with	  
100	  or	  less	  diggs	  and	  maybe	  4	  comments.	  I	  like	  playing	  the	  
digg	  game	  but	  my	  faith	  	  in	  any	  REAL	  algorithm	  is	  gone.
Some	  people	  like	  to	  always	  believe	  in	  Santa	  Claus	  too,	  
but	  I	  like	  common	  sense	  and	  reality...
-­‐	  Lizbett,	  March	  25	  201066
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SUBJ:	  Re	  -­‐	  Bury	  if	  you	  haven’t.	  It’s	  FP
And	  as	  I	  predicted	  earlier:"This	  [liberal]	  sub	  just	  past	  
the	  10	  minute	  mark...	  It	  will	  probably	  stay	  down	  for	  about	  
another	  5	  to	  10	  hours	  and	  then	  the	  A.M.A.(Algorithm	  My	  
Ass)	  will	  kick	  in	  and	  promote	  this	  story...
-­‐	  Individually	  Warped,	  March	  26	  201067
	  
	
  The opaque Digg algorithm was a source of constant fascination and frustration for the 
Patriots. When liberal posts they thought safely buried popped back to the top, or conservative 
posts they backed with their collective forces failed to rise, the Patriots suspected that the Digg 
algorithm was at best broken, and at worst a sham, a technological facade which laundered the 
San Franciscan sympathies of its engineers. Their complaints could be read as admittedly 
vulgar versions of Winnerian critiques of the politics of artifacts: the unpredictable output of 
algorithms anthropomorphized into human capriciousness, as liberal politics embedded in the 
infrastructure of code.68 Some of them came to believe that the algorithm was even a lie. “I 
think there are no ‘readers’ claiming that it's inaccurate, but digg admin themselves. I also 
think that it won't reach front page because digg admin won't let it,” suspected J.69 This is an 
especially striking observation because it was precisely J. who, in other situations, so clearly 
envisioned Digg as a tool he could reliably repurpose. Yet even for him there was no single, 
essential algorithm, but rather many algorithms imagined differently depending on whether it 
was behaving as they expected.
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3. “A Rude Wake-Up Call”: Reading the Digg Patriots
SUBJ:	  Re:	  Digg	  Patriots
Being	  a	  popular	  Digg	  user	  was	  fun.	  But	  it	  was	  a	  lot	  of	  
work	  too.	  I	  am	  not	  sure	  of	  what	  my	  rank	  was	  before	  the	  
site	  was	  sold	  and	  changed	  formats,	  but	  I	  was	  in	  the	  top	  
200.	  There	  were	  others	  in	  the	  group	  with	  higher	  rankings	  
than	  mine.	  To	  get	  a	  story	  popular	  on	  Digg,	  you	  had	  to	  
follow	  other	  Digg	  power	  users	  loyally	  and	  upvote	  or	  "digg"	  
their	  submissions.	  The	  sweet	  spot	  was	  about	  200	  to	  300	  
mutual	  friends.	  The	  reason	  I	  am	  telling	  you	  this,	  is	  
because	  the	  most	  successful	  members	  of	  the	  DiggPatriots	  
were	  friends	  with	  all	  types	  of	  people	  who	  were	  just	  as	  
dedicated,	  just	  as	  addicted,	  just	  as	  loyal	  to	  the	  site	  but	  
were	  in	  no	  way	  conservative.
Getting	  a	  submission	  to	  the	  front	  page	  of	  Digg	  meant	  that	  
hundreds	  of	  thousands	  of	  people	  would	  see	  your	  submission	  
and	  comment	  on	  it.	  Once	  I	  started	  to	  get	  the	  knack	  of	  the	  
site,	  I	  could	  get	  a	  front	  pager	  nearly	  every	  day.	  
What	  was	  the	  best	  thing	  to	  come	  out	  of	  Digg?	  I	  became	  
really	  close	  friends	  with	  all	  the	  active	  members	  of	  
DiggPatriots.	  I	  never	  met	  them	  in	  real	  life,	  but	  I	  talk	  
Figure 4: A screenshot of the Patriots’ Yahoo!Group file directory. Note the guides and tools posted by chroniccolonic.
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with	  them	  on	  the	  phone	  and	  I	  consider	  them	  to	  be	  very	  good	  
friends.	  We	  are	  still	  really	  good	  friends	  to	  this	  day.
If	  it	  were	  not	  Digg,	  we	  would	  not	  have	  known	  each	  other.	  
For	  that,	  I	  could	  not	  thank	  the	  creators	  of	  Digg	  enough.
-­‐	  ChronicColonic,	  February	  23	  201370
SUBJ:	  Re:	  Digg	  Patriots
In	  short,	  the	  Digg	  Patriots	  was	  a	  response	  to	  a	  wave	  of	  
leftism	  that	  had	  grown	  smug	  and	  arrogant	  in	  its	  presence	  
on	  Digg.	  We	  were	  a	  rude	  wake-­‐up	  call	  that	  there	  were	  those	  
who	  felt	  otherwise	  within	  Digg.
-­‐	  R.J.	  Carter,	  February	  12	  201371
	
 By August 2010 the Patriots were planning to leave Digg. A proposed redesign, created 
in part to help stop what administrators called “bad behavior like group-burying,” eliminated 
the bury button and mutuals, thwarting the Patriots’ methods. The group began to shift to 
other venues, and on August 1st, 2010, phil d. targeted their first link on reddit.72 Later that 
week a muckraking blogger named OleOleOlson - who was also the Patriots’ most hated foe 
on Digg - published a post entitled “Massive Censorship of Digg Uncovered.”73 He accused 
them of “a widespread campaign of censorship” and published excerpts from their listserv to 
prove it.74 The story drove the Patriots deep underground; their archive breaks off as sharply 
as it began, and there is no reliable record of their continued activity. 
	
 What do we know of the Digg Patriots? They thought they could make Digg and, by 
extension, other users more conservative by gathering together not only their own members 
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74 Ironically, Olson himself was an unabashed Digg strategist, who proudly published guides for how progressives 
could use mutuals to extend their message just as the Patriots had. See, e.g., “Progressives Guide to Social Media 
3: Digg,” http://newsjunkiepost.com/2012/02/14/progressives-guide-to-social-media-3-digg/. The few Digg 
Patriots I was able to reach were all angry that Olson, whom they believed manipulated Digg just as much as 
they, had not only been able to successfully cast them as censors, but had escaped similar blame him. 
but also mutuals and the affordances of the algorithm. They were profoundly social, but not 
only with humans, but with technologies, and humans which they treated like technologies: 
they battled against humans (liberals) and algorithms (as liberal) with the assistance of humans 
(as tools) and algorithms (as tools). Their exact impact is uncertain, but there is no doubt that 
they made Digg different by fighting to make liberal content less visible than it would have been 
without their intervention.75 
	
 This complicated legacy could be read in several different lights. Their urge to battle 
liberals as underdogs could be placed historically in the context of the decline of a particular 
brand of conservatism. Their understanding of Digg as a manipulable system could be situated 
culturally in the context of comparative privilege providing a sense of strategic agency.76 Their 
need to cooperate to achieve their goals could be considered paradoxically in the context of 
their strongly individualistic ideology. Their efforts to suppress and silence, rather than 
promote and engage with, expression could be read ironically in the context of their frequent 
‘patriotic’ references to the Constitution.
	
 In this thesis, however, I’m interested in understanding how Olson, along with 
countless others, could so easily read the Patriots as censors, for this interpretation tells us less 
about the Patriots proper than it does about the interpreters themselves. Why were the Patriots 
almost universally understood as bad actors subverting Digg and not (say) as an oppressed 
minority resisting hegemony? What makes group burying ‘bad behavior’? Why did Digg 
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forbid it? If the Patriots were ‘breaking’ Digg, what exactly were they breaking, and why? 
Where, whom, or from what do these expectations arise that the Patriots could violate them? 
III: UNDERSTANDING USER-GENERATED CENSORSHIP
The interesting question is not whether Twitter is censoring its Trends list. 
The interesting question is, what do we think the Trends list is, what it 
represents and how it works, that we can presume to hold it accountable 
when we think it is “wrong?” What are these algorithms, and what do we 
want them to be?
- Tarleton Gillespie, “Can an Algorithm Be Wrong?”77
1. As Corrupting Collective Intelligence
	
 One way to model the impact of the Patriots is as corrupting the collective intelligence 
which would otherwise be elicited by Digg. Social media have long been popularly understood 
as systems for aggregating the wisdom of many minds: “an essential part of Web 2.0,” wrote 
Tim O’Reilly in 2005, “is harnessing collective intelligence, turning the web into a kind of 
global brain...”78 Platforms like blogs and social media, he wrote, lowered the barriers to 
publish to the Web, which permitted more people to post and link between content with 
powerful emergent effects. According to O’Reilly, “much as [Google’s search algorithm] 
PageRank produces better results than analysis of any individual document, the collective 
attention of the blogosphere selects for value.”79
	
 Perhaps the most popular contemporary writer on collective intelligence is James 
Surowiecki. In his book The Wisdom of Crowds Surowiecki argues that, under certain conditions,  
markets, or systems which behave like markets, can elicit some aggregate collective intelligence 
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superior to that distributed among its constituent members.80 Surowiecki himself believed new 
media to offer opportunities for the ‘wisdom of crowds’ to emerge: collective intelligence, he 
argued, is “the reason the Internet search engine Google can scan a billion Web pages and find 
the one page that has the exact piece of information you were looking for.”81
	
 But not all crowds are wise, and not everything collected by them constitutes 
intelligence. Surowiecki identified “four conditions that characterize wise crowds:”82
• Diversity of opinion: each person should have some private information, even if it’s 
just an eccentric interpretation of the known facts
• Independence: people’s opinions are not determined by the opinions of those around 
them 
• Decentralization: people are able to specialize and draw on local knowledge 
• Aggregation: some mechanism exists for turning private judgments into a collective 
decision
	

	
 Surowiecki’s pop scholarship has distinguished intellectual ancestry. He traces his work 
directly to Frances Galton, but another forebear could well have been the Marquis de 
Condorcet, who advanced a statistical argument for democracy in 1785. His eponymous jury 
theorem in “Essay on the Application of Analysis to the Probability of Majority Decisions” 
proved, as a matter of math, that if every voter in a given pool is more likely than not to vote 
‘correctly,’ the probability that the majority vote is ‘correct’ increases with the size of the pool 
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(and decreases if voters are more likely to be ‘wrong’).83 Surowiecki’s contemporaries include 
Cass Sunstein, who adopted the Condorcet theorem, along with Hayek’s price theory and 
other tools from economics and political science, to divine the conditions under which certain 
systems, particularly ‘Web 2.0’ systems like Slashdot and Wikipedia, may elicit ‘correct’ 
answers.84 
	
 These models of collective intelligence share some common premises. First, for at least 
some questions a ‘correct’ answer exists, and at least part of this knowledge is distributed 
among individuals. Second, this distributed knowledge, which Surowiecki calls “private 
information,” can be aggregated if many individuals are allowed to make decisions 
independently. Independence is a key criterion because it allows crowds to solicit private 
information from many uncoordinated sources such that their individual ‘errors’ do not 
correlate and compound.85 The more private information the better, since, in theory at least, 
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inaccuracies should cancel out such that only ‘good’ information remains, like salt left behind 
by evaporated seawater.86 	

	
 For Surowiecki and Sunstein, collective intelligence is disrupted by foreknowledge or 
coordination, either of which corrupts private information and produces information cascades. 
Information cascades, Surowiecki writes, occur “when people’s decisions are not made all at 
once but rather in sequence, so that some people go to one of the [options] first and then 
everyone else follows in order,” transforming decisions into “a sequence of uninformed choices, 
so that collectively the group ends up making a bad decision.”87 When actors don’t act 
independently, or when there is insufficient diversity of opinion, collective intelligence is 
impaired; as with Condorcet, it is reliably unreliable. 
	
 From this perspective the Digg Patriots can be seen to corrupt the conditions necessary 
for collective intelligence to reliably emerge. Surowiecki’s model requires humans to behave 
with naive, autonomous independence; indeed, he specifically acknowledges ‘situatedness’ as a 
problem for collective intelligence. The Patriots and their mutuals, however, constituted a 
coordinated conservative bloc which colluded to form information cascades. Kristina Lerman 
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has demonstrated that “social networks [within Digg] have a strong impact on the number of 
votes received,” and the Patriots maintained armies of mutuals to achieve precisely this 
dispositive effect.88 
	
 But while seeing the Patriots as disrupting popular models of collective intelligence is 
straightforward, it’s also not necessarily the most productive perspective to adopt. It’s been 
well-documented that social media aren’t particularly effective aggregators of collective 
intelligence under the best of circumstances, as Surowiecki himself pointed out when reddit 
persistently misidentified suspects after the bombing of the Boston Marathon.89 In a striking 
study of over 170,000 links posted to reddit, Eric Gilbert found that over 52% of the links 
which became popular were in fact resubmissions which had failed to initially become popular, 
demonstrating that the community was a reliably unreliable arbiter of its own interests.90 
	
 There are two other reasons that the collective intelligence model, while still very 
popular in the social media context, is not a particularly helpful guide to understanding user-
generated censorship. First, it presumes that knowledge exists ‘out there’ in the world to be 
elicited by processes, which runs against the proposition that knowledge is instead constructed 
through processes. It’s not a priori obvious that the Patriots should be evaluated by to what 
degree they made Digg more or less ‘correct’ as much as that they made Digg different. Second, 
because the collective intelligence model eschews coordination in favor of independence, it 
doesn’t provide a conceptual apparatus by which to understand the Patriots as a strategic 
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group; it can only characterize them as ‘bad actors.’ These are not, of course, problems with 
collective intelligence as a model, but they may be indications that collective intelligence might 
not be the most useful way to think about user-generated censorship. 
2. As Reintroducing Heteronomy to the Networked Public Sphere
	
 Another way to model the Patriots is as reintroducing heteronomy to the networked 
public sphere. The concept of the networked public sphere was introduced by Yochai Benkler 
in Wealth of Networks as a component of his contention that the Internet constitutes a 
revolutionary advance for human freedom.91 Before discussing the Patriots’ effect on the 
networked public sphere, however, it may be helpful to explore Benkler’s ideas a bit. Though 
the concept of the public sphere is most strongly tied to the work of Jurgen Habermas, whom 
Benkler frequently cites, the line tying the two is actually deceptively long and twisty, as 
Benkler’s theory of the public sphere departs from Habermas’ in several important respects. 
	
 First, for Habermas, a “public sphere from which specific groups would be eo ipso 
excluded was less than merely incomplete; it was not a public sphere at all.”92 This necessary 
condition of “universal access” was most famously critiqued by Nancy Fraser when she 
hammered Habermas for allegedly ignoring the exclusion of women from his historical 
examples of the public sphere.93 Benkler, however, readily acknowledges that the Internet is 
neither universally accessible nor equivalently used. For his purposes it is instead sufficient 
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that the networked public sphere a) offers “universal intake” in principle and b) has a broader 
“intake basin” in practice than that of the mass-media.94 
	
 Second, as Ben Roberts observes, it’s “very important for Habermas that [the public 
sphere] for rational debate is kept separate from the political apparatus.”95 According to Mark 
Warren, “Habermas emphasizes that public spheres cannot be organizers of collective action, 
and must be protected from imperatives of collective action...[all democratic organizations] 
must distinguish arenas of decisions and organizations of action.”96 For Benkler, however, the 
promise of the networked public sphere is precisely the opportunities it offers for the two to 
mix: most his examples, such as the 2004 boycott of Sinclair Broadcasting Group organized 
through progressive blogs, are cases in which the processes of establishing and enacting a 
consensus blend together into some more potent political accelerant than either on their own.  
	
 Third, as Stuart Geiger notes, the function of the public sphere most critical for 
Habermas is “the admittedly arduous process of negotiating with those that one would not 
ordinarily meet in private life.”97 For Habermas, democratic solidarity arises not from merely 
mixing people in space, but from interlocuters conferring equal standing and respect upon each 
other, the first step in a long process of exhaustive controversy through which different 
lifeworlds are made commensurate. Geiger contends that the very painlessness of distributed 
filtration mechanisms precludes them from functioning as Habermasian public spheres. But 
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Benkler defines the public sphere as “the set of practices that members of a society use to 
communicate about matters they understand to be of public concern and that potentially 
require collective action or recognition.” In other words, for Benkler the public sphere doesn’t 
develop between people: it emerges across the network.98 Indeed, he implies that he values the 
networked public sphere precisely for its peaceable synthesis of public opinion through a 
liberal pluralist process as against the critical deliberative tradition of Habermas which seeks to 
negotiate common understanding.99 
	
 The cumulative effect of these various departures is that Benkler transforms public 
spheres from a) universally accessible, politically neutral discursive spaces in which people 
negotiate mutually intelligible lifeworlds through communicative action to b) comparatively 
accessible, politically engaged speech systems configured by technology and policy through 
which people are more or less free to engage in speech acts. Benkler’s use of the term ‘public 
sphere’ has led most to construe his as a Habermasian project, but his contribution is actually 
much more innovative and interesting than simply extending Habermas’ concepts around a 
new domain, for instead he has developed his own ‘digitally native’ model of the public sphere 
which lends itself to an entirely different mode of investigating the Internet. 
	
 Because Benkler’s model shifts the purpose of the public sphere from negotiating 
mutually intelligible lifeworlds to providing freer platforms for speech, he values the 
networked public sphere because he believes it more autonomous than the mass-mediated.100 
He characterizes the mass-media as a narrow band of speakers or subjects filtered to high 
visibility by state or market power and the Internet as a broad band of speakers or subjects 
38
98 Benkler, Wealth of Networks, 177. 
99 Benkler, Wealth of Networks, 184.
100 Benkler, Wealth of Networks, 16. 
filtered to high visibility by mechanisms broadly distributed to users. The economics of 
networked information production shift the most relevant considerations for freedom from 
publishing to filtering: when anyone can speak, “the central point of failure becomes the 
capacity to be heard—who listens to whom, and how that question is decided.”101 
	
 It is critical to understand that the Internet does not remove this point of failure. Indeed, 
it cannot be removed, for, as in the Babel objection, if anyone can speak, no one can be heard.  
Instead, Benkler argues that the Internet diffuses and distributes it. Unlike the mass-media, he 
argues, the networked public sphere possesses “no single point of failure for discourse: no 
single point where observations can be squelched or attention commanded—by fiat or with the 
application of money.”102 According to Benkler, the well-documented unequal distributions of 
attention to websites are not the product of power, but rather “emerge from many small-scale, 
independent choices where free choice exists...power law distributions of attention to Web sites 
result from random distributions of interests, not from formal or practical bottlenecks that 
cannot be worked around...”103 These random distributions are collected, computed, and 
reflected, he argues, not by emperors or editors but by distributed filtering mechanisms. Thus, 
“we see the Babel objection solved on a distributed model, without anyone exerting formal 
legal control or practical economic power [through the] coordinate effects [of] uncoordinated 
actions.”104
	
 The crux of Benkler’s argument is thus that the networked public sphere has “no 
obvious points of control or exertion of influence—either by fiat or by purchase.”105 From this 
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perspective the Digg Patriots can be seen to disrupt the networked public sphere by 
identifying and seizing upon a third point of control, exerting their power not through the state, 
or through the market, but through the algorithm. Under their sway Digg reflected not solely the 
coordinate effects of uncoordinated actions, but also the coordinate effects of coordinated actions. As 
such, the Patriots, aligned with their mutuals and empowered by algorithms, threaten to 
reintroduce what Benkler calls “heteronomy, of dependence on the judgment of others that 
subjects individuals to their control...”106 Suddenly it is no longer clear how or by whom the 
power law distributions of attention are produced! This is a problem, because for Benkler 
there is a sharp normative distinction between unequal distributions of attention produced 
from uncoordinated action (good) and those produced by coordinated action (bad). 
	
 Like collective intelligence, the networked public sphere can be thus disrupted by 
coordinated activity, but unlike Surowiecki, Benkler embraces situated human action, because 
“liberal theories that ignore culture are rendered incapable of answering some questions that 
arise in the real world and have real implications for individuals and polities.”107 Instead, 
Benkler advocates developing an approach “able to diagnose different conditions in the 
practical cultural life of a society as more or less attractive from the perspective of liberal 
political theory.”108 From this perspective the Patriots can be seen as problematic culture 
warriors who produce normatively bad cultural conditions by sidestepping the synthesis of the 
networked public sphere, refusing to either peaceably clear disputes or negotiate mutually 
intelligible lifeworlds. For Benkler, there needs to be some form of discourse, even if it is 
emergent across a network rather than between individuals. The Patriots, however, sought to 
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simply suppress the ‘other side’ rather than engage it in deliberation, even going so far as to 
treat comments instrumentally rather than discursively. Instead of clearing their disputes or 
negotiating lifeworlds, they worked to escalate disputes and totalize lifeworlds. 
	
 Compared to collective intelligence, the networked public sphere offers a much more 
theoretically sophisticated model by which to understand and assess user-generated 
censorship. It provides a clear vision for what the Internet ought to be (a freer platform for 
speech) and a simple rubric by which to evaluate the effects of the Patriots against its 
realization (by reintroducing heteronomy and refusing to engage in the synthesis of opinion). 
	
 However, the networked public sphere model also doesn’t completely cover some of the 
core characteristics of user-generated censorship. While Benkler is very concerned with power 
wielded by traditional authorities, he doesn’t provide a conceptual apparatus to think about the 
problems posed by algorithmically-empowered individuals. There’s also a huge liberal theory 
foundation beneath Benkler’s work - the focus on speech acts, on freedom, on abstract 
individuals, and so forth - that may not be helpful to import to discussions of user-generated 
censorship. And the peaceable vision of the networked public sphere doesn’t quite seem to 
capture the fighting spirit of the Patriots, who did not think of themselves as engaged in the 
emergence of a consensus, but sought instead to win a contest and simply change everyone else. 
	
 As with collective intelligence, this doesn’t mean that the networked public sphere is a 
bad model, just that it might not be the useful model by which to understand user-generated 
censorship specifically. An even more effective model might account for factors that both of 
these miss: the core coordination, the argumentative style, the desire to effect a sort of change 
through the assembled strength of many actors. One such model might be drawn from the field 
of science-technology studies, particularly the work of Bruno Latour.
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3. Or: As Actor-Networks Assembling Artifacts
	
 Latour is a French sociologist perhaps best known for studying the means by which 
scientific arguments are made stronger, transforming mere propositions into hard facts. Yet 
Latour doesn’t fit comfortably in either camp of the so-called ‘science wars’ of which he is a 
indisputably a veteran: as Graham Harman observes, Latour has been “attacked 
simultaneously for opposite reasons,” by scientists as “another soft French relativist” and by 
social theorists as “a sellout to fossilized classical realism.”109 
	
 One of Latour’s central theses may be oversimplified as follows: all facts (arguments, 
ideas, institutions, and so on) are socially constructed, but they are not all constructed equally 
strongly, nor are they constructed solely by and of humans. In order to study or explain a fact 
(of what and by whom it is built; why and to where it spreads), the social scientist must not 
appeal to generalized ‘social forces’ which ‘lie behind,’ ‘contextualize,’ or ‘give power to’ the 
argument. Instead, they should trace the specific human and nonhuman actors who are 
recruited to form the fact. “I can now state the aim of this sociology of associations more 
precisely,” writes Latour: “there is no society, no social realm, and no social ties, but there exist 
translations between mediators that may generate traceable associations.”110
	
 For example, consider a researcher who claims to have discovered a new bacterium. 
When challenged to defend her claim, she may cite the microscope through which she saw it, 
the method through which she defined it, and another journal article which guided her work. 
The microscope, the method, and the article are all actors which she enrolls into an alliance 
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supporting her claim, and her claim depends on their continued cooperation. If her microscope 
is well-calibrated, her method sound, and the article credible, then her allies held fast, and her 
claim stays strong. But if the lens is defective, her method obsolete, or the article flawed, they 
betrayed her, and her claim may fail. As Harman writes, from a Latourian perspective all facts 
are fundamentally fights, and each brawler only as strong or as weak as its assembled allies: 
It is never the actant in naked purity that possesses force but only the 
actant involved in its ramshackle associations with others, which 
collapse if these associations are not lovingly or brutally 
maintained...Any actant has a chance to win or lose, though some 
have more weaponry at their disposal. The loser is the one who failed 
to assemble enough human, natural, artificial, logical, and inanimate 
allies to stake a claim to victory.111
	
 But while Latour can be reasonably said to believe in the ‘social construction of 
scientific facts,’ for him the ‘social’ refers not to some exclusive domain or character of human 
sociality, but the process of associating together many human and nonhuman actors. Facts, 
propositions, ideas, concepts are not more or less ‘objectively true,’ but more or less well-
constructed. The strength or weakness of a fact arises, not from the fact itself, but from the 
assembled strength or weakness of its allies, many of which are nonhuman. From this 
perspective, atoms are more real than angels not because the former exist in reality and the 
latter in prayer, but because atoms are more strongly linked with many other actors, like 
mathematics and bombs.112 
	
 Latour thus lends social constructions the stubborn strength of nonhuman actors. 
Anyone can dispute Newtonian physics, but they must battle both the Royal Academy of 
Sciences and also apples insistently falling to earth. Against such tightly-knit facts the gods 
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themselves contend in vain unless, like a Swiss patent clerk, they can convince enough 
assembled actors to turn traitor such that it unravels itself like an old sweater.113 The social 
scientist thus investigates a fact which she wishes to understand as an engineer investigates a 
mountain through which she wishes to tunnel: by “[negotiating] with the mountain at each 
stage of the project, testing to see where the rock resists and where it yields, and [being] quite 
often surprised by the behavior of the rock.”114 
	
 Actor-networks become stronger by incorporating more and stronger actors into 
themselves. The more associations the more durable the actor-network becomes because each 
member has a stake in the whole thing holding together. The actor-network acts by translating 
and transforming along the chain: “every time you want to know what a nonhuman does,” writes 
one of Latour’s alter egos, “simply imagine what other humans or other nonhumans would 
have to do were this character not present.”115 These actors became delegates of the actor-
network which issue forth like Nazgûl from Mordor. But no delegate is neutral, and no 
delegation is costless. A hotel wishing to greet its guests with open doors may hire a porter, or 
it may install a machine; each may solve the problem, but only after having been disciplined in 
particular ways with different effects. 
	
 The most reliable delegates may congeal into black boxes. Like utterly trusted 
lieutenants, black boxes seem to carry out orders without imposing their own biases, opinions, 
motivations, or other transformative, translative effects. But this is only an illusion, for any 
black box may be opened to reveal its politics, either through the careful prying of a 
determined investigator or after being exploded by the box’s own unexpected behavior. 
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Harman has compared Latour’s black boxes to Heidegger’s tools: taken-for-granted and ready-
at-hand until they break or malfunction, at which point their contingencies, dependencies, and 
configurations suddenly leap screaming to the foreground.116
	
 From this perspective we might see the Patriots as assembling an actor-network 
through Digg. Like the Pasteurization of France, the Patriotization of Digg proceeded by and 
through the enrollment of mutuals as delegates, evaluated on their technical characteristics and 
disciplined like door-closers. The most reliable mutuals came to be seen as black boxes, but as 
soon as they failed the alliance by behaving unexpectedly or unreliably they were inspected 
and discarded like broken hammers. Algorithms could be allies too: like a megaphone which 
amplifies human voice, their strategic leveraging allowed the Patriots to make their points more 
loudly. Yet, like unreliable mutuals, those same algorithms could also seem to work against the 
Patriots, weaken their arguments, and leave them cursing the human and nonhuman traitors 
which had betrayed their alliance. 
	
 In this chapter I have not conducted a proper actor-network analysis of the Digg 
Patriots. However, I find the conceptual toolkit of actor-network theory, and more generally 
science-technology studies, to offer several advantages as an approach for thinking about user-
generated censorship. First, this approach enables the descriptive study of user-generated 
censorship without being weighed down by the normative baggage of other models.  Second, it 
begins from a presumption of coordinated activity, and provides a versatile set of tools by 
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which to track and understand the alliances of humans and nonhumans which emerge through 
sociotechnical systems.
	
 But if we are to see the Patriots as making arguments through Digg, we need not only 
ask how these arguments are made (that is, by the association of human and nonhuman 
actors), but also the form which these arguments eventually take. As Harman writes, for Latour 
“truth and reality are assembled through chains of actors in the same way that bills go through 
Congress: slightly transformed and translated at each step, and failing as often as they succeed. 
All reality is political, but not all politics is human.”117 Truth and reality are made manifest in 
things. A hypothesis becomes a finding, becomes a result, becomes a fact. A discussion becomes 
a bill, becomes a law, becomes a right. But into what does user-generated censorship harden? 
What are the artifacts of its politics? 	
  
IV: THE SOCIAL PRODUCTION OF WHAT?
Take the library of the British museum, for instance, valuable and useful 
and accessible as it is: what chance has a work of being known to be there, 
merely because it is there? If it be wanted, it can be asked for; but to be 
wanted it must be known. No one can rummage the library.
- Augustus De Morgan, to Charles Babbage118
1. The Ark in the Archives: On the Centrality of Sociotechnical Systems
	
 In asking after the artifacts of the politics of user-generated censorship, I do not mean, 
as Langdon Winner has famously argued, artifacts which embody a particular politics, but 
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merely artifacts which are the result of a politics.119 If, as I have argued, alliances of actors 
assemble together the front page of Digg, the Facebook News Feed, Google Search results, 
and so on through political processes, then these assemblies, once assembled, are themselves 
the artifacts of politics. But what are these artifacts, and what are their metaphysics? When the 
Patriots coordinate to change Digg, what are they changing, and how does it change? 
	
 It’s trivial to observe that social media are socially produced; the far more interesting 
question is what is produced through the process of social production.120 One possible answer is 
a kind of representation, like a map, which guides users through an otherwise unnavigable 
flood of information. Such signposts are so central as to be invisible, yet profoundly influential 
despite - indeed, because of - their invisibility. “Information infrastructure is a tricky thing to 
analyze,” observe Bowker and Star, because “Good, usable systems disappear almost by 
definition. The easier they are to use, the harder they are to see.”121  
	
 Perhaps an example, set in a familiar scene, can make them more visible. In the closing 
moments of Raiders of the Lost Ark, shortly after federal agents refuse to reveal its location to 
Indiana Jones, the camera cuts to anonymous hands nailing the ark inside a wooden crate.122 
An old man wheels it slowly down the aisle of an enormous warehouse packed full of 
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innumerable crates, each indistinguishable from that which contains the ark. The worker turns 
left. As ominous music builds, the ark vanishes from view, effectively lost in plain sight among 
a sea of infinite, identical crates.
	
 Suppose Indiana Jones decided to search for this ancient and dangerous artifact. It is 
not enough for him to merely infiltrate the warehouse. He needs to know where to begin 
looking, yet despite the considerable determination and unorthodox methods of Professor 
Jones, his search would almost certainly be stymied without the aid of some Ariadne’s thread 
to follow through the warehouse. Blair and Stallybrass have traced the origins of the verb “to 
file” to mean the literal stringing of documents along a wire - that is, a filum - and so too must 
Jones move only ever down the organizational filaments leading to the ark.123 Thumbing 
through the folder of “O” for “Occult” he may find a slip of paper indexing its location; by the 
door, a map depicts the layout of the warehouse, which he may navigate by following signs 
amidst the stacks. Eventually Jones may indeed find the crate, but only if every step along the 
way holds true. If the index is off, the map incorrect, or any other link in the chain snipped (by 
earnest error or strategic mislabeling), Jones is lost, and so too the ark. No one can rummage 
the warehouse. 
	
 This story illustrates how objects may be formally accessible yet contingently findable. It 
underscores the central role of sociotechnical systems in making available information; that is, 
assisting its location or discovery. Indeed, to archive the ark in the warehouse means not only to 
put the box on a shelf but also to enroll it in a system through which it may later be located. 
Stamping with an identifying number, indexing into an inventory, mapping against the stacks: 
each nonhuman actor in this chain refers to the next, paving the pathways along which Jones 
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must travel. The spacious warehouse in Raiders collapses in practice to these tiny, two-
dimensional conduits through which knowledge actually circulates. The ark is ‘in’ the archives, 
but effectively can’t be found ‘there’; instead, it’s found through sprawling sociotechnical 
systems. As Latour once said at a lecture on globalization, “…we always tend to exaggerate the 
extent to which we access this global sphere…There is no access to the global for the simple 
reason that you always move from one place to the next through narrow corridors without ever 
being outside.”124
	
 Discussions of censorship usually focus on an imagined formal accessibility of objects: is 
the book/painting/record ‘in’ the library/gallery/store? But once we see objects as existing not 
‘in’ space but through passageways, our focus reorients around these newly-realized relations.125  
From this perspective the questions of how, by whom, and for what reasons these corridors are 
tunneled and reinforced elevates from ancillary interest to central significance. User-generated 
censorship operates by reconfiguring these corridors with the assistance of social media 
machines, a metaphor I’ve adapted from the media historian Markus Krajewski. 
2. Social Media as Machines which Manage the Flood
With the invention and spread of printing with movable type, a 
complaint arises in the learned reading world. It is the book flood, 
always a nautical or irrigation metaphor, that has a disturbing effect 
on readers in the newly established privacy of their studies...Only 
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when the library is inundated is the need to deal with all of this 
material recognized.126
	
 So begins the second chapter of Krajewski’s improbably enthralling Paper Machines: 
About Cards & Catalogs, 1548-1929, which traces the development of card catalogs as a response 
to newly abundant information after the introduction of the printing press. Krajewski’s book is 
a refreshing reminder that neither our contemporary concerns nor favored metaphors for 
information overload are new.  “...Paper also became so cheap, and printers so numerous, that 
a deluge of Authors covered the land,” complained Alexander Pope in The Dunciad. As James 
Gleick notes, “Deluge became a common metaphor for people describing information surfeit. 
There is a sensation of drowning: information as a rising, churning flood.”127 The deadly flood 
had to be tamed by tools: “...the shortness of our life and the multitude of things that one must 
know today to count among the learned do not allow us to do everything ourselves,” wrote 
Gabriel Naude in 1627 of the need to rely on instruments to manage the book flood.128
	
 Card catalogs were among the instruments developed to help readers navigate this 
intensely-felt flood of information. While the earliest bibliographic practices indeed consisted 
of little more than lists of books in a library’s collection, it was Leibniz, as director of the 
library at Wolfenbüttel, whom Krajewski credits with first arriving at the idea of cataloging 
books on paper slips which could be easily rearranged to account for new additions.129 The 
first actual catalog wasn’t created for nearly a century, when one was developed for the 
Viennese royal library, coincidentally during the same decade that the Empress Maria Theresa 
ordered conscription numbers be publicly posted as addresses to help the monarchy identify 
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soldiers among “an indistinct sea of houses.”130 As their respective empires expanded, both 
royals and readers developed methods to help them find objects amidst their newfound 
abundance.
	
 Krajewski calls card catalogs paper machines because they “can be described as a chained 
mechanism” which does the work of organizing information when powered by the user’s 
hand.131 Following the dominant metaphors of the time, he argues that the organizational work 
which card catalogs do can be understood as channeling the book flood by digging canals 
which tame the torrent into more manageable streams. But there is no translation without 
transformation: card catalogs, like all mediators, do not simply transmit information 
unperturbed, but impose their effects as they go. Krajewski notes that “it would be insufficient 
to mark only beginning and end, sender and receiver. Rather, what is crucial is the way this 
transfer occurs, including any disturbances, changes, stoppages, irritations and detours,” and 
so he carefully tracks the manner by which card catalogs transform the books to which they 
also refer.132 Cards in catalogs, as mobile, rearrangeable pointers to books located in the the 
stacks, also “[embody] a highly compressed data set that characterizes the book to be found...
[becoming] a representation of the text - which now need no longer be read every time.”133 A 
card must compress, distort, transform the book to which it points; else it is not a card, but the 
book itself, and the flood continues to rise. 
	
 The key insight here is that card catalogs play a central, rather than incidental or 
ancillary, role in connecting readers to books. In any collection of meaningful size, card 
catalogs mediate the two; it is only by traveling through cards that readers find books. Yet it is 
51
130 Krajewski, Paper Machines, 21. 
131 Krajewski, Paper Machines, 7.
132 Krajewski, Paper Machines, 3.
133 Krajewski, Paper Machines, 23.
precisely their role in making books more findable which makes them an attractive avenue of 
intervention for those who wish to make books less findable. Krajewski calls the specter of lost 
cards “the sum of all librarian’s fears,” and this specter came to haunt the University of Illinois 
in the 1960s when, according to Nicholson Baker, student radicals targeted card catalogs for 
disruptive action.134 Over 50,000 cards were burned and scattered in February 1969: “The 
tragedy,” library Dean Robert Downs told the Daily Illini, was that now “there won’t be a 
complete record of all the books in the stacks and in the various departmental libraries.”135 In 
response, the University of Chicago placed its catalog under armed guard for months while it 
carried out a secret project to microfilm a backup copy of its cards.136 This is the strange, 
dialectical quality of finding devices: that, because they help find, they may also be repurposed 
to inhibit finding.
	
 Krajewski models card catalogs as machines which, through their mobility and 
reconfigurability, assist readers in managing the book flood. The raging river of print never 
receded, but was eventually tamed by a system of locks and canals, its well-channeled waters 
eventually powering the turbines of knowledge production.137 We might extend his model to 
understand social media as machines which help manage the digital flood. Nautical metaphors 
for information abundance are as common today as they were in the time of Leibniz and Pope; 
like our analog ancestors, we constantly feel at risk of drowning beneath its rising tides, and 
need new mechanisms by which to channel the waters. 
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 Like cards constituting compressed versions of books, the links exchanged through 
social media pack whole websites, pictures, and films into tiny, mobile representations. A link 
on  Digg is not merely a pointer, but a “highly compressed data set that characterizes” the site 
to be found at the other end, annotated by net upvotes and user comments. But these links are 
mobile vertically in a way that cards are not. Social media streams are usually organized around 
metaphors of depth: sites like Digg and reddit enable users to vote good content “up” and bad 
content “down”, while services like Twitter and Facebook algorithmically curate “top” posts. 
It’s as if the information flood acquired a new digital dimension; as if, when information 
overflowed its banks, social media responded by digging the riverbed deeper. Dave 
Weinberger has argued that, on social media, “[filters] no longer filter out. They filter forward, 
bringing their results to the front.”138 He might instead have said, with a bit more accuracy, 
that social media don’t filter out: they filter down.
	
 This is a fundamentally different model of knowledge management than paper 
machines. Card catalogs often have outdated ontologies but within their schema all books in a 
given collection are equivalently available; nothing is ever at the “bottom” of a card catalog. 
But the users of social media, by operating the chained mechanisms of algorithms, surface some 
stories, submerge others, and stop still more at their source. Reading the front page of Digg, or 
the Facebook News Feed, is like standing atop a rock in a dark, swift river: while some objects 
are clearly visible, having been buoyed to the surface, countless others rush by invisibly in the 
depths. The latter can be found by a determined reader - but only if she dons goggles, hold her 
breath, and dives deeply in search of them, and even then only if she knows to look. 
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 Like card catalogs, social media sit centrally between readers and information; their 
mechanisms make their compressed referents to content more or less visible. John Rajchman, 
building on Foucault, argues that “spaces are designed to make things seeable, and seeable in a 
specific way.”139 So too with social media which, with their surfaces and submergences, are 
also designed to make certain things unseeable in a specific way. Information is always 
immediately at risk of being drowned beneath the waterline in social media streams, 
submerged sufficiently to suffocate for lack of air and attention. Taina Bucher has called this 
the “threat of invisibility:” unlike the all-seeing eye of the panopticon which regulates by 
imposing visibility before its inescapable gaze, the mechanisms of social media regulate by 
imposing “the constant possibility of disappearing” beneath the surface.140
	
 User-generated censorship enforces this threat, leveraging social media machines to 
make certain information effectively unfindable. Like student radicals sinking whole sections of 
the stacks back into the book flood, the Digg Patriots submerged liberal links deep in social 
media streams, rendering them less visible than they would have been without their 
intervention, sucked under by an algorithmic riptide. These objects remain accessible but 
suddenly less available, the long chain of references linking them buried too deeply to be easily 
followed by casual travelers. Whole pathways drown beneath the waves like lost continents, 
while others pop to the surface in their stead, distracting from what has gone missing. 
	
 The subversive genius of user-generated censorship is that it intervenes not on objects 
but on the routes through which they can be found, which are erased or made to appear less 
interesting to travel down. It’s a quiet, subtle mode of strategic action, which, through the 
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laundering of algorithms, is often not even distinguishable as such. Censoring objects is usually 
loud and noisy: a banned book is obviously gone, and a blocked website is self-evidently 
inaccessible. User-generated censorship eschews such crude methods, instead hiding its targets 
in plain, unseeable sight, sunk in the muck at the bottom of the social river. 
3. The Social Production of Persuasive Panoramas
	
 User-generated censorship is a strategic repurposing of the general filtering function 
which tames the flood. By making information more or less available, social media produce 
influential representations of the things which exist to be viewed, experienced, accessed, as 
well as links leading directly to them. In other words, they make maps, providing both a list of 
destinations and well-paved pathways through which they can be found. But, as Alfred 
Korzybski observed, the map is not the territory.141 Indeed, the map cannot be the territory, for 
a map of the earth the size of the earth would be just as unnavigable.142 The interesting 
question, then, is not whether a given representation of the world is incomplete, but in what ways 
it is incomplete; that is, which aspects were omitted in compression, with what effects? 
	
 In Reassembling the Social Latour discusses two different types of representations: 
“clamps,” as he calls them, to help compress the world so it can be mapped. The first kind of 
map Latour calls oligoptica.143 Unlike their implicit opposites, all-seeing panoptica, oligoptica 
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provide self-evidently narrow, limited lines of sight to the things surveyed. Deploying his 
favored military metaphors, Latour characterizes a war room as an oligopticon, from which 
generals may view scenes from a distant front only long as the attenuated connections hold; as 
such, they are hyperaware of their dependence on satellites and radios, and that they are not 
able to see what’s happening where the camera isn’t. The second kind of map Latour calls 
panoramas. “Contrary to oligoptica,” he writes, “panoramas...see everything. But they also see 
nothing since they simply show an image painted (or projected) on the tiny wall of a room fully 
closed to the outside.”144 Panoramas, in other words, are representations which do not reveal 
their own incompleteness. As Latour writes: 
[Panoramas] are being painted every time a newspaper editorialist 
reviews with authority the ‘whole situation’; when a book retells the 
origins of the world from the Big Bang to President Bush; when a 
social theory textbook provides a bird’s eye view of modernity; when 
the CEO of some big company gathers his shareholders; when some 
famous scientist summarizes for the benefit of the public ‘the present 
state of science’; when a militant explains to her cellmates the ‘long 
history of exploitation’...They design a picture which has no gap in it, 
giving the spectator the powerful impression of being fully immersed 
in the real world without any artificial mediations or costly flows of 
information leading from or to the outside. Whereas oligoptica are 
constantly revealing the fragility of their connections and their lack of 
control on what is left in between their networks, panoramas give the 
impression of complete control over what is being surveyed, even 
though they are partially blind and that nothing enters or leaves their 
walls except interested or baffled spectators. To confuse them with 
oligoptica would be like confusing a war episode monitored from the 
U.S. Army war room in Tampa, Florida, with the same one related on 
Fox News when a retired general is commenting on the ‘day at the 
front’. The first account, which is a realist one, knows painfully well 
that it can become unreal as soon as communications are cut off; the 
second one might be just as real but it has a smaller chance of telling 
us whether or not it’s fiction.145
 
56
144 Latour, Reassembling the Social, 187.
145 Latour, Reassembling the Social, 188. 
	
 From this perspective we might see the maps of social media as constituting persuasive 
panoramas. Panoramas, because the pictures they provide do not volunteer their own 
incompleteness; persuasive, because their reflexive silence fails to betray the many ways in 
which their representations are incomplete, luring the viewer into believing they are looking at 
a comprehensive and natural image of the world, as if through a clear lens, when in fact they 
are watching a wholly political performance. Social media, as sociotechnical systems, can be 
understood to assemble users and algorithms together to make arguments about what is 
important, what is relevant, what is “trending,” what is “top,” and so on; these arguments are 
manifest in the panoramic artifacts projected onto their front page, their News Feed, their 
search results, and so on. 
	
 All representations of the world are compressed, but they are not all compressed the 
same way, and the composition of representations is a primary concern in media studies. Critical 
theorists across fields and activists of all stripes routinely critique different pictures of the 
world as dominant and hegemonic while working to construct alternate and resistive narratives 
from subaltern perspectives, and so on. Indeed, a core insight of media studies is that the 
narratives, perspectives, and representations made through media help constitute our 
ontologies, our ontologies our lifeworlds, and our lifeworlds our politics. What these Latourian 
concepts provide is a way to distinguish between representations based on their epistemological 
earnestness. Oligoptica see the world through tunnel vision, and continuously destabilize 
themselves by foregrounding their own dependencies and contingencies. Panoramas, on the 
other hand, are born stable, whole, and totalizing; they must be forced to admit their 
incompleteness.
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 The power of user-generated censorship derives from these epistemological tensions.146 
Panoramas are persuasive not because there is no gap in them but that there seems to be no gap. 
Any absence is utterly inconspicuous: the eye seamlessly elides what it does not expect to not 
see, like Muggles simply failing to notice the Knight Bus.147 Fundamentally, it’s a problem of 
unknown-unknowns: there’s no real reason to look for what isn’t included in Google’s search 
results, what isn’t highlighted in the Facebook News Feed, what doesn’t rise to the top of reddit 
or Digg. The panorama provides users a convincing map of what exists and what is interesting 
such that they do not notice what they do not notice. 
	
 Latour has recently shifted his focus from critique to composition, taking a surprising 
Habermasian turn towards negotiating a common world.148 “A world that you have to compose 
is not the same thing as a world you have to discover, and not the same thing as a world you 
have to uncover,” says Latour; instead, it is something you make.149 One way to understand 
user-generated censorship is as recomposing the common world produced by social media, 
shifting objects between the foreground and background of the panorama such that the artifact 
remains apparently natural and undisturbed. It’s as if a clever Church cleric, ordered to paint 
fig leaves on nudes but aware of the attention his painfully obvious censorship might bring, 
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could instead, through some trick of the eye, subtly alter the painting such that viewers simply 
elided the offending portions of their own unconscious accord. 
	
 At its most basic, the user-generated censorship theory of change is a classic technique 
of agenda setting, of altering media representations, akin to convincing a newspaper editor to 
not run a story or a textbook editor to change her history book. Yet it is not merely this, for 
these are new levers, distributed to different actors, laundered by algorithms, emerging from 
complex systems often inaccurately presumed to be free of such politics. Almost anyone, with 
the timely aid of a few allies, can cut a backroom deal with an algorithm to help suppress a 
story, change a narrative, shift a lifeworld, and these interventions leave far subtler traces than 
their analog analogues. No books are burnt. No redactions highlighted in black marker. Just 
some roads quietly dropped from the map, pathways effaced or erased, such that their 
destinations become much harder to find. “Can’t get there from here,” my grandparents from 
Maine sometimes simply say; so too it is with user-generated censorship. 
V: CONCLUSION
...[Social media practices] reflect something genuinely new, and as yet not 
clearly theorized, distinct equally from Habermasian communal 
conversation-as-deliberation as from the blandly managerial product, 
shaped by layers of human talent for the broadest possible distribution, of 
Adorno and Horkheimer's Kulturindustrie. 
- Finn Brunton, “Spam: A Shadow History of the Internet”150
1. The Relevance of User-Generated Censorship
	
 In this thesis I have studied user-generated censorship as an emergent mode of 
intervention made possible by social media. I grounded it in the case of the Digg Patriots, who 
assembled and maintained human and nonhuman allies in order to make Digg different than it 
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would have been without their intervention. I compared social media machines to paper 
machines as sociotechnical systems which make specific information more or less available 
amidst general abundance. Finally, I analogized the artifacts of social media machines to maps 
which provide more or less obviously incomplete representations of the world, as panoramic 
pictures which can be recomposed to alter the pathways paved by and through them. But an 
important question remains: so what? What is the significance of user-generated censorship? 
Why does it matter? What makes it worth thinking about, worth writing about - and, if you’ve 
made it this far, worth reading about? 
	
 The most straightforward answer is that social media are politically important. They are 
among the most influential informational intermediaries we have. To the extent that social 
media mediate people - to the extent they pave the routes of passage through which we must 
travel to come to know things, as well as lists of destinations which may come to be known - 
changing the composition of social media changes the composition of the (un)common world of 
which they are themselves a constitutive element. As such, the representations made by and 
through social media merit the same critical attention long paid to other representations of the 
world made by newspapers, television news, history books, and so on. 
	
 A corollary observation is that the artifacts of social media are no more ‘natural’ or 
‘neutral’ than the artifacts of other media - nor could they be. It is not only, as Daston and Galison 
have shown, that the very meaning of ‘objectivity’ has changed over time.151 Nor is it only that 
there is no way to transform the territory into the map without losing something in the process 
with political effects. More fundamentally, it is that the territory itself effectively does not exist 
to be mapped, but is in fact constituted by its mapping. When James Surowiecki argues that 
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for “Google searches, there is a definitive answer, which at some point is settled once and for 
all...whether it found the right page or not,” he mistakes, to paraphrase the legal realists, the 
reason for the result.152 Search is as indeterminate as law: the ‘right page’ is not that which 
preexists the search, to be uncovered by Google, but that which is produced by the search, 
through sociotechnical alliances assembled precisely to make the proposition of ‘rightness’ 
seem more or less persuasive.153 
	
 Social media cannot be ‘natural’, yet we desperately want them to be, to the point of 
creating truly bizarre ontological categories. Compare, for example, Google’s fascinating 
prohibition of ‘unnatural links.’154 What makes authoring a hyperlink - which exists only ever 
in an electronic world as produced by humans or their delegates - more or less ‘natural’? A 
configuration of chromosomes? A state of mind? A mode of creation? Or consider The Atlantic’s  
revelation that, in Facebook’s dispute resolution process, human moderators “optimize for half 
a second” of time before deciding whether to retain or remove the flagged content based on a 
complex set of fixed rules, an algorithm inscribed on paper rather than manifest in code.155 
From the perspective of biology, Facebook’s moderators are unquestionably human, yet from 
the perspective of the dispute resolution process, they are effectively a computer, one which 
recovers the original definition as the job description of one who computes.156  
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posts of the Patriots, humans and algorithms are often ontologically indistinguishable, 
oscillating across the nature/culture boundary depending on whether they are behaving as 
expected at any given time. When mutuals or algorithms ‘worked,’ they seemed neutral, 
natural tools; when they ‘resisted,’ they were instead opened to find the people and politics 
packed inside. The same is true of their opponents, like Olson, who first began to suspect the 
existence of an organization like the Patriots when Digg did not behave as he expected. Oddly, 
actual people seem to be invisible in social media - until things go poorly. It is only when the 
systems do not behave as expected that the presence of people becomes apparent as the source 
of the biases, inadequacies, and errors. Thus many of these platforms forbid ‘manipulating,’ 
‘altering,’ or doing ‘unnatural’ things, which necessarily imagines some ‘unmanipulated,’ 
‘unalterated,’ ‘natural’ paradise lost. Perhaps it is my childhood talking, but there’s something 
strangely Catholic about this: as if when human motivations, behaviors, or incentives are 
recognized in social media, the first instinct is to read them as contaminant; as sin. 
	
 It is out of this gap between the designer and the user, between the author and the 
authorized, that the very possibility of user-generated censorship emerges, like a plant growing 
from cracks in concrete. It is only because Digg was imagined to produce some ‘unaltered’ 
representation of the world that the activities of the Patriots could cause such concern. It is 
only because Google imagines a certain kind of links as ‘natural’ that other kinds of links can 
become unnatural. When I began discussing J30Strike with a former Facebook engineer she 
interrupted to exclaim “ah, you’re talking about people misusing the spam button” only 
because she could envision a different use which is not misuse. When I asked a respected 
Internet scholar about my case studies he offhandedly characterized them as “exploitations” of 
social media because “everyone knows they aren’t supposed to behave like that.” The central 
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conflict of the Digg Patriots is suddenly shown to not be between liberals and conservatives at 
all, but between the expectations of the designers of platforms and the acts of their resistive 
users, revealing the actual hierarchies animating ‘democratized’ media.157 
	
 User-generated censorship is not, as it may initially appear, a simple story of bad 
humans and algorithmic levers, but instead a complex narrative which interweaves the agency 
and expectations of many ontologically uncertain actors. It is best understood not as a 
standalone practice but as one which coevolved interdependently with a lush material-semiotic 
ecology.158 User-generated censorship is not only relevant politically, but productive 
intellectually, because the process of investigating its emergence leads one to the unexpected 
conditions which made its emergence possible. It thus transforms from a subject of inquiry to a 
vehicle of inquiry, facilitating access to certain questions which it makes more visible and 
interesting to ask, questions which pertain not only to the continued study of user-generated 
censorship, but more generally to the algorithmic turn.159
	
 One set of questions are ethnographic. For user-generated censorship, as for other 
algorithmic phenomena, it may be asked: who are the actors involved? What are their 
categories and concepts, their epistemologies and ontologies? How may their associations be 
traced? Such questions are best answered by appealing to the actors themselves. These 
investigations may proceed through traditional ethnography, such as the interviews Malte 
Ziewitz has conducted of search engine optimization engineers, or those Nick Seaver is 
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157 This, I think, is the core insights of Evgeny Morozov’s critique of the Internet as “The Internet.” To the extent 
that we see “The Internet” as an assembled object made of unspoken expectations what it “ought” to be, it inhibits 
us from asking certain questions from perspectives which do not share those assumptions. Morozov, To Save 
Everything Click Here.
158 For an excellent history of a practice coevolving in a sociotechnical ecology, see generally Brunton, Spam; see 
also Stuart Geiger, “The Lives of Bots,” in Wikipedia: A Critical Point of View, ed. Lovink & Tkacz (Amsterdam: 
Institute of Network Cultures, 2011), http://www.stuartgeiger.com/lives-of-bots-wikipedia-cpov.pdf/.
159 For one definition of the algorithmic turn, see William Uricchio, “The algorithmic turn: Photosynth, 
augmented reality and the changing implications of the image.” Visual Studies 26, no. 1 (2011): 25-35.
conducting of music recommendation algorithm developers.160 Or, they may employ more 
radical methods, such as Stuart Geiger’s technique of “trace ethnography” which enables him 
to decode large-scale quantitative documentary data into nuanced qualitative accounts of the 
human and nonhumans who animate Wikipedia, or Taina Bucher’s careful excavation of the 
concepts and categories embedded in the algorithms of programmed publics.161 
	
 Ethnography is a powerful method for eliciting and describing actors, their categories, 
and their associations. Yet it can also be limited, for a faithful ethnography, informed by its 
subjects, is often blind in the same ways they are. This is especially true for the accounts of 
actor-network theory. Latour cheerfully characterizes ANT as “myopic” precisely because of 
its shortsighted perspective, which then gives rise to the problem of “plasma”: 
namely, that which is not yet formatted, not yet measured, not yet 
socialized, not yet engaged in metrological chains, and not yet covered, 
surveyed, mobilized, or subjectified. How big is it? Take a map of 
London and imagine that the social world [traced] so far occupies no 
more room than a subway. The plasma would be the rest of London, 
all its buildings, inhabitants, climates, plants, cats, palaces, horse 
guards...If knowledge of the social is limited to the termite galleries in 
which we have been traveling, what do we know about what is 
outside? Not much.162
	
 The problem of plasma is fundamentally this: when you follow the actors, trace their 
associations, and elicit their categories, you are left with a highly-descriptive but narrow 
version of the subject of study. We know something about the Digg Patriots from their unusual 
qualitative corpus. But what of the rest of Digg? What of the other users and their artifacts? 
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160 See Malte Ziewitz, “Evaluation as Governance:The Practical Politics of Reviewing, Rating and Ranking on the 
Web,” http://ziewitz.org/projects/evaluation-as-governance.html; Nick Seaver, “Knowing Algorithms”, http://
web.mit.edu/comm-forum/mit8/subs/abstracts.html#seaver/.
161 For an introduction to trace ethnography, see Geiger & Ribes, “Trace Ethnography: Following Coordination 
through Documentary Practices” in Proceedings of the 44th Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences 
(HICSS). http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/HICSS.2011.455; Taina Bucher, “The friendship assemblage: Investigating 
programmed sociality on Facebook”, Television & New Media (2012), http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1527476412452800/.
162 Latour, Reassembling the Social, 244; 242. 
What of the 70 million people who monthly visit reddit? Or the billions of human and 
nonhumans actors who assemble together Google’s search results? We cannot trace all their 
associations, and even if we could, we would just be tangling ourselves in an ever more 
complex web of threads without any ability to characterize what is being woven. 
	
 Ethnography may thus be complemented by archaeology: the process of comparing the 
artifacts of social media. Instead of tracing the associations of the actors who assemble an 
artifact, this approach holds the artifact thus assembled against another, revealing the 
differences between them. These comparisons do not themselves ‘say anything,’ but the process 
of making visible these differences opens pathways for inquiry about why and how they are 
different, for what reasons and with what results. 
	
 This approach is particularly useful for the study of social media. If, as I have argued, 
the interlocking levers of social media machines often produce panoramic representations of 
the world, these deceptive projections must be made to admit their incompleteness with the aid 
of diagnostic instruments. For example, my colleague Nathan Matias at the MIT Center for 
Civic Media has helped develop the OpenGenderTracking toolkit, which he has used to reveal 
some startling differences between the gender representation of authors in U.K. newspapers.163 
Nate is now building an application called FollowBias which visualizes the gender distribution 
of one’s Twitter feed, thus foregrounding a factor of its composition which would otherwise 
easily sink to the background.164 
	
 If the methods of ethnography provide tools which help investigators trace the assembly 
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163 Matias & Evans, “Women's representation in media: readers preferences for online news revealed”, The 
Guardian: Datablog, October 23, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2012/oct/23/women-media-
representation-online-news. The OpenGenderTracking toolkit is available at http://opengendertracking.org/blog/
2013/01/08/Tracking-Gender-In-Online-News/. 
164 FollowBias is presently available for installation at http://followbias.com/. 
of artifacts, these archaeological instruments, like magnifying glasses or slides, help them notice 
differences between artifacts already assembled, which provides a path forward not only for 
scholarly inquiry but also for pragmatic intervention. It is only once someone notices that their 
Twitter feed is comparatively male, or their subreddit comparatively liberal, that they can 
decide what they want to do about it. The most productive path forward is to deploy these 
complementary approaches in complementary fashion, for the relevant distinction is not 
between qualitative and quantitative methods, but rather between tracing the assembly of an 
artifact and comparing artifacts once assembled. By these means we may come to see the maps 
of social media for what they are: incomplete and unnatural in any given configuration, yet 
indispensable in function for navigating the unfathomable largeness of the networked world. 
APPENDIX
A.1: The Digg Patriots Data: Origins, Controversies, Considerations
	
 I was first introduced to the Digg Patriots by Drew Harry, who pointed me to 
OleOleOlson’s 2010 Alternet article exposing their existence.165 Additional research led me to 
an article by Olson published in the NewsJunkiePost a few weeks after the original report.166 In 
this article, Olson revealed that the source material for his stories had come from an archive of 
the Digg Patriots’ Yahoo!Group listserv. He wrote: 
Our investigation team decided early on that we should not release the 
full archive on Wikileaks due to the presence of personal information 
on DP members, and they have manipulated this decision to attempt 
to claim that this is manufactured. The Digg Patriots have been asked 
numerous times on public forums to agree to sign a release of all mass 
communications archived from the Yahoo group if they would like to 
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165 Olson, “Massive Censorship of Digg Uncovered.” 
166 Olson, “Digg Patriots Censorship Part 2: The Evidence”, NewsJunkiePost, October 15, 2010, http://
newsjunkiepost.com/2010/10/15/digg-patriots-censorship-part-2-the-evidence/. 
our investigation team to take a much longer approach of redacting 
personal information manually.  That archive is now available at 
NoTruePatriot.org.
	
 Though there were, by Olson’s count, between 30,000-40,000 messages exchanged 
between the Patriots, NoTruePatriot.org contained around 13,000 posts in HTML form, which 
Olson attributed to an aggressive redaction program. I was able to access NoTruePatriot.org 
from summer 2011 through February 2012. By April 2012, however, the site had been replaced 
by a generic landing page for GoDaddy.com, presumably the domain’s registrar. I contacted 
Olson and another member of his investigation team, but before they responded to me, the site 
was restored. I used a free Firefox extension called DownThemAll to download all of the files 
for local storage in case the archive disappeared again. Sure enough, within a few months it 
was gone, apparently purchased by domain squatters. To the best of my knowledge there is no 
copy of the NoTruePatriot archive now available publicly through the web. 
	
 I decided to parse the messages in the HTML files into plain text to assist in my 
qualitative analysis. Beth Hadley ’15 helped me write a Python program using the 
beautifulSoup library which pulled some important information (date, time, subject, and body) 
out of the posts and wrote them to text files. The program also produced a spreadsheet which 
(among other things) counted links to Digg.com to help me quantify their contents. This 
process yielded 12,742 posts. I imported the text files, along with the original HTML files, into 
a DEVONthink database, and then read every post, tagging and highlighting them as I went. 
After several days I had tagged several hundred posts with dozens of categories, and I 
excerpted from these posts in Chapter II. I have by no means told “the whole story” of the 
Patriots. There were many fascinating characters, dynamics, subplots, and so forth which I 
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abridged. Instead, I have tried to tell a faithfully representative story of the Patriots for the 
purposes of understanding user-generated censorship as a mode of action. 
	
 I have struggled with the question of whether to publish my copy of the NoTruePatriot 
archive along with my thesis. On the one hand, it is a vibrant, interesting, rich data set which is 
no longer publicly available. Publishing it for general access would both enhance my own work 
(by making its source material available alongside it) and also potentially provide opportunities 
for future scholarship. On the other hand, the Patriots’ corpus contains a great deal of personal 
information, which its members clearly intended to not be available to a general audience. 
Although Olson’s “investigative team” did redact most email addresses and names from the 
posts, they did not remove all of them, and many of the Patriots can be quickly reidentified 
through cursory Google searches. 
	
 A major complicating factor is the considerable controversy over how Olson’s team 
took possession of the corpus. Olson told me via email that the messages had been leaked by a 
“disaffected Digg Patriot.” He pointed me to a post on NewsJunkiePost written under the name 
Sam Pennington - according to Olson the investigative leader of the team - which alleged that 
the messages had been “forwarded” to them by at least two members of the Patriots.167 
Pennington claimed that these members had become disturbed by the online activity of a 
Patriot called R.J. Carter. Carter, however, responded by arguing that screenshots posted by 
Pennington showed they had been taken by someone logged in as him, and accused 
Pennington of hacking his Yahoo account to access the archives.168 However, after the Digg 
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167 Sam Pennington, “The Digg Patriots Investigation: How We Exposed DiggGate”, NewsJunkiePost, October 19, 
2010, http://newsjunkiepost.com/2010/10/19/the-digg-patriots-investigation-how-we-exposed-digggate/. 
168 R.J. Carter, “NewsJunkiePost Implicated in Computer Hacking to Breach DiggPatriots Yahoo Group,” R.J. 
Carter’s Line in the Sand, December 6, 2010, http://therjcarter.wordpress.com/2010/12/06/newsjunkiepost-
implicated-in-computer-hacking-to-breach-diggpatriots-yahoo-group/.
Patriots were exposed, they began using Skype chats to communicate, and some of the logs of 
these chats were later published in what Carter himself called a definite leak.169 Olson, for his 
part, claimed that he had always believed Carter was the mole, and had been accusing 
Pennington and others of hacking in order to cover his tracks. There is much interesting 
intrigue but almost no certainty or clarity surrounding the provenance of the corpus. 
	
 On several occasions I attempted to contact the Patriots to interview them directly. I 
managed to identify email addresses and Facebook accounts for several Patriots but most failed 
to respond to my inquiries. However, my message was forwarded to the current Digg Patriots 
mailing list and R.J. Carter (intrigue!) emailed me to discuss his thoughts on the Patriots. I 
asked him how the Patriots would feel about me making their archive public again. He told me 
that, while he himself did not care since he was proud of their actions, most other members did 
not want them to be published anew. This was the clearest signal I had yet about how the 
Patriots felt about the corpus I had come to possess. 
	
 I have tried to balance the academic interest in the Patriots’ archive with respect for 
their privacy as contextual integrity.170 As a result I have also decided not to make my copy of 
the Patriots’ archive publicly available at this time, because of my ethical discomfort with 
indiscriminately sharing information which had been intended for a small audience and 
subsequently published to a general audience without their consent. However, I plan to 
provide the corpus to the MIT archives to preserve it for future scholarship, and researchers 
may contact me via email at chris [dot] peterson [at] mit [dot] edu to request a copy.
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169 Olson, email to author, February 11, 2013. 
170 See generally Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy in Context: Technology, Policy, and the Integrity of Social Life (Stanford 
Law Books, 2009). 
A.2: The Digg Patriots Data: Some Exploratory Visualizations
	
 I used the spreadsheet which I generated from the Patriots’ corpus to produce some 
data visualizations with Tableau. I did not include them in my case study chapter because they 
were not ‘findings’ I wanted to share, but rather instruments which guided my exploration of the 
corpus, drawing my attention to particular users, patterns of use, and so forth.171
Figure 5: Gantt Projection of the Activity Index
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171 For more on visualizations-as--exploration, see generally Schnapp et al, Digital_Humanities (MIT Press, 2012). 
	
 Figure 5 depicts a Gantt chart of a measure I developed called the “activity index,” 
which is the sum of the count of messages sent by a user and the count of links to Digg 
submitted by that user. Each dot represents a week during which that user sent a message to 
the list, the size of the dot scales with the size of that week’s activity index, and the users are 
ranked in order of their activity index over the length of the corpus. This chart illustrated 
different patterns of use. Some I expected: for example, that Lizbett was the most active, while 
many members barely registered a trace. Some surprised me: minarchian, a libertarian activist 
who joined the Patriots latest among its members, was still so active during his admittedly short 
tenure that he had one of the highest activity indices overall. Had I been interested in telling 
the story of the Digg Patriots qua the Digg Patriots, as opposed to qua user-generated 
censorship, a chart like this would have been invaluable in helping me identify a ‘central cast’ 
on whom to focus my narrative attention. I have included below another Gantt chart which 
narrows its scope to a dozen such members to illustrate the point. 
Figure 6: A Gantt Projection of the Activity Index for 12 Core Members of the Digg Patriots
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 Figures 7 and 8 flip the Gantt projection on its axis and split the activity index into its 
constitutive elements: posts which contain links to Digg, and posts which contain no links to 
Digg, which I have called commentary. While the distributions follow the trend of the activity 
Figure 7: Distribution of Digg Links Submitted
Figure 8: Distribution of Commentary
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index, the delineation between links and commentary allowed me to distinguish between types 
of users. Notice, for example, that Brendan M. sent far fewer messages with links to Digg than 
he did without. A close inspection of his posts reveals that, rather than initiating a course of 
action, Brendan preferred to join the fray, and sent lots of gossipy, joking, ‘smalltalk’ messages 
back and forth among his friends in the group. A similar pattern can be seen in VRayZ, who, 
despite being the second most active user overall behind Lizbett, skewed heavily towards 
commentary, which corroborates his status as a senior ‘thought leader’ within the Patriots. 
Figure 9: Post Contents Over Time
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 Figures 9 and 10 depict the contents of the posts in the corpus over time. In Figure 9, 
the total height of both the blue and orange bars is equal to the number of posts sent to the 
group during that week.172 This chart shows that in most weeks the Patriots made more posts 
that did not contain links to Digg (blue) than did (orange). However, as Figure 10 shows, the 
total number of links per week often exceeded the number of posts sent during that time, 
because posts which did contain links contained large numbers of them. These charts illustrate 
two modes of engagement with the listserv: the majority of messages which constituted of 
commentary, and a minority of messages which were densely packed with links to target for 
intervention. 
	
 That’s it. Thanks! 
Figure 10: Links vs Posts Over Time
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172 The spike in June and July appears to be an artifact of the redaction process, which was not fully completed 
for these months according to Olson, rather than an actual increase in activity during that time. This discrepancy 
itself was revealed in the process of making these visualizations. 
